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HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL’S UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW AS A FORUM OF FIGHTING
FOR BORDERLINE RECOMMENDATIONS?
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GROUND
Kazuo Fukuda1*
ABSTRACT—Highly acclaimed as a key innovation of the United
Nations Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) was
created in 2006 as a cooperative, peer-review mechanism to shift away
from the highly politicized Commission on Human Rights. Despite the
significance and hope attached to the UPR, it has been conspicuously
under-examined in the U.S. legal scholarship. And most relevant literature
elsewhere has avoided directly addressing the fundamental question of
exactly what the UPR’s added value is to the global human rights regime in
terms of its direct contribution to improving human rights situations on the
ground. This is mainly due to methodological and analytical challenges to
measure the impact of the UPR in isolation from other existing human
rights mechanisms. While acknowledging such challenges, this article
attempts to provide one such answer to the question from a normative
perspective: it argues that the UPR’s added value lies in providing a forum
to incrementally and constantly challenge the threshold of states under
review for accepting their commitment to addressing controversial human
rights issues. Drawing from the experiences of the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic and other countries as well as the literature on peer
pressure and acculturation, this article articulates the current issues of the
UPR mechanism in terms of recommendations given to states under review
by their peers and suggests the way forward for the UPR mechanism by
reframing it as a forum of fighting for borderline recommendations.
1 *
Kazuo Fukuda is a Ph.D. candidate at Indiana University’s Center for Constitutional
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INTRODUCTION
Created in 2006 in conjunction with the establishment of the United
Nations Human Rights Council (“HRC”),2 the Universal Periodic Review
(“UPR”) is a peer-review mechanism in which all 193 UN member states
essentially assess each other’s human rights records on a periodic basis and
provide recommendations to improve human rights situations on the
ground.3 For many stakeholders, the UPR marked an important shift away
from the Commission on Human Rights (“CHR”), which was often
2
See G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 5(e) (Mar. 15, 2006) (“Undertake a universal periodic review, based on
objective and reliable information, of the fulfillment by each state of its human rights obligations and
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to
all States”).
3
See generally HRC Res. 5/1, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1 (June 18, 2007).
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criticized for its selectivity and politicization.4 For instance, scholars and
practitioners alike have touted the UPR as “the most innovative feature
emerging from the 2006 reform of the United Nations human rights
machinery,”5 “the jewel of the crown of the Council,”6 and “the most
significant recent addition to the international human rights system.”7 Then
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also considered the UPR a central
component of the new Council.8 UN member states praised the UPR during
the First Session of the HRC as “a significant value-added [sic] to the
Council”9 and “a healthy change of course in relation to the politicized,
over-selective focus on the human rights situation in specific countries.”10
The Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal even mentioned that “[s]uccess of the
Council would . . . depend on how [the UPR] mechanism would be crafted
and executed.”11
Given this context, much literature (albeit conspicuously underexamined in the U.S. legal scholarship) has primarily grappled with the
question of whether the UPR mechanism has lived up to such expectations
by examining the rates at which states under review (“SuRs”) accept and
implement recommendations from other UN member states. The literature
in this vein generally shows that the UPR has proven its relevance in
improving human rights situations on the ground: UN member states have

4

See, e.g., Nazila Ghanea, From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council:
One Step Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?, 55 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 695, 703-04 (2006); Mathew
Davies, Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the HRC of the United Nations, 35 ALTS. GLOB., LOC.,
POL. 449, 457-59 (2010); Rosa Freedman, New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council, 29
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 289, 292 (2011). See also infra I.B.
5
JOSÉ PARRA, BEYOND THE PROCEDURE: THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW AS A CATALYST FOR
PUBLIC DEBATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2016), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/13278.pdf.
6
ERIC TISTOUNET, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: A PRACTICAL ANATOMY 185 (2020).
7
Judith R. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Future of Human Rights Accountability for Global Health
through the Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL HEALTH: RIGHTS-BASED
GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING WORLD 537, 537 (Benjamin Mason Meier & Lawrence O. Gostin
eds., 2018).
8
See U.N. Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, ¶¶ 6-8, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.1 (May 23, 2005).
9
Peter MacKay, Minister for Foreign Affs. of Can., Statement to the First Session of the Human
Rights Council 3 (June 19, 2006), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/Regular
Session/Session1/HLS/canada.pdf.
10
Celso Amorim, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, High Level Segment of the First Session of
the Human Rights Council at 4 (June 19, 2006), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HR
Council/RegularSession/Session1/HLS/brazil.pdf.
11
K.P. Sharma Oli, Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal, Statement at the First Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 19, 2006), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/Regular
Session/Session1/HLS/nepal.pdf.
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on average accepted about 70% of UPR recommendations12 and
implemented roughly half of accepted recommendations.13 However, some
precaution is warranted in understanding these statistics, as researchers
have found it “impossible”14 to establish the direct and exclusive causality
between the UPR and the improvement of human rights situations on the
ground.15 After all, the UPR constitutes only a part of the overall human
rights machinery that has been in operation at the international16 and
national17 levels, forming complex interplays and thus rendering it
challenging to attribute certain human rights improvements solely to a
particular mechanism.
12
Edward McMahon & Marta Ascherio, A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal
Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, 18 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 231, 238 (2012); Sangeeta
Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Use of International Human Rights Law in the Universal Periodic
Review, 21 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 264, 275 (2021).
13
SUBHAS GUJADHUR & MARC LIMON, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS GROUP, TOWARDS THE THIRD CYCLE
OF THE UPR: STICK OR TWIST? LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW 6 (2016), https://www.universal-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/URG_UPR_
stick_or_twist.pdf. UPR Info also reports that states have either partially or fully implemented about
half of recommendations. UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES: THE IMPACT OF THE UPR ON THE GROUND 14
(2014), https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/2014_beyond_promises.pdf.
[hereinafter UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES]. Established in 2008, UPR Info is a non-governmental
organization which aims to promote human rights through the UPR. Its involvement in the UPR process
is extensive, ranging from policy and advocacy through its publications and also participation in
discussions at the HRC and across various UN mechanisms to in-country technical assistance to SuRs,
national human rights institutions, and CSOs. See UPR Iɴғᴏ, https://www.upr-info.org/en (last visited
October 23, 2021).
14
Constance de la Vega & Cassandra Yamasaki, The Effects of the Universal Periodic Review on
Human Rights Practices in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC
REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM 213, 214 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014);
similarly, others consider it “clearly not possible.” See GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note 13, at 37.
15
See Kate Gilmore et al., The Universal Periodic Review: A Platform for Dialogue,
Accountability, and Change on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, 17 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J.
167, 171 (2015) (arguing that “moving from commitment to effective action cannot be attributed solely
to the UPR, which does not function in a vacuum. Instead, the UPR builds political momentum and
complements other international, regional, and national dynamics, such as electoral and social
mobilization processes.”).
16
For the list of the existing human rights mechanisms, see Human Rights Bodies, U.N. OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R OF HUM. RTS. (OHCHR), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Human
RightsBodies.aspx (last visited July 20, 2021).
17
In the context of developing countries, UN organizations, embassies, bilateral development
agencies, and NGOs (local, national, regional, and international) are typically involved both jointly and
separately in addressing human rights-related concerns in close coordination with host governments.
For instance, in Lao PDR, many human rights-related concerns have been discussed and addressed in
the framework of the Governance Sector Working Group. For the list of organizations involved in this
mechanism, see LAO PDR DEP’T OF PLAN. & COOP., GOVERNANCE SECTOR WORKING GROUP UNDER
ROUND TABLE PROCESS 26-28 (2015), https://rtm.org.la/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/GSWG-bookletENG.pdf. For the cooperation framework for UN agencies on human rights-related work, see UN IN
LAO PDR, UNITED NATIONS PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK 2017-2021, at 16-7, 28 (2016) https://laopdr.
un.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/2016%20UNPF_2017-2021_English.pdf.
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With this in mind, what are the UPR’s unique values to the global
human rights regime? Facing methodological challenges, little literature to
date has tackled this fundamental question directly and substantively.18
While acknowledging the inherent methodological challenge of measuring
the UPR’s unique values and impacts, this article attempts to address this
question by proposing to frame the UPR from a novel perspective: as a
forum of fighting for borderline recommendations.
This article defines borderline recommendations as (1)
recommendations that SuRs accepted but have yet to implement; and (2)
recommendations that SuRs decided not to accept (or in the official
terminology “noted”19) but demonstrated interests to engage with. And it
argues that the UPR’s unique value does not lie in addressing
recommendations on opposite ends of the spectrum on which SuRs tend to
hold predetermined positions. In other words, with or without the UPR,
SuRs will most likely implement “easy” recommendations that they find no
issues with, and reject “sensitive” recommendations that they are strongly
opposed to. Thus, albeit encouraging, the rates of accepting and
implementing recommendations in themselves do not indicate the UPR’s
success or failure. The UPR’s added value, rather, lies in offering a forum
to commit an SuR to accepting and implementing borderline
recommendations. The UPR’s success ultimately depends on whether and
to what extent peer pressure exerted by recommending states and other
relevant stakeholders20 could lead to new or renewed commitments
expressed by SuRs on controversial human rights concerns which would
18
Only a handful of scholars have attempted to address this question. See e.g., Karolina M.
Milewicz & Robert E. Goodin, Deliberative Capacity Building Through International Organizations:
The Case of the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 513 (2018)
(examining the direct impact of the UPR on state actions by focusing on the timing of the
implementation of UPR recommendations).
19
SuRs hold only two choices with regard to UPR recommendations: accepting or “noting” them.
The term “note” generally signals a de facto rejection (thus no implementation) of those
recommendations. See, e.g., TISTOUNET, supra note 6, at 11 (“those recommendations [that are noted]
are not accepted and in certain instances are utterly rejected by the SuR, although UN terminology does
not use such terms”); Gayatri Patel, How ‘Universal’ Is the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review
Process? An Examination of the Discussions Held on Polygamy, 18 HUM. RTS. REV. 459, 462 (2017)
(“formally, no recommendations are recorded as being ‘rejected’ by the SuR in the UPR process.
However, often, the statements made by the SuRs, which accompany the responses, provide a strong
indication when a recommendation is rejected.”). Nevertheless, accepted and noted recommendations
are both included in the outcome report that will be adopted by the HRC. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra
note 3, ¶ 32. For more details on the term “note/noting,” see infra p. 10.
20
For the rest of the article, “other relevant stakeholders” shall mean (unless indicated otherwise)
various institutions and actors that are involved in improving human rights situations in SuRs at local,
national, regional, and/or international levels. Such stakeholders include but are not limited to national
and international NGOs, UN agencies, regional and multilateral organizations, bilateral development
agencies, and scholars with country expertise.
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not have manifested without the UPR. Drawing from the experiences of the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (hereinafter Lao PDR) and other
countries as well as the literature on peer pressure and acculturation,21 this
article articulates the current issues of the UPR mechanism in terms of
recommendations given to SuRs by their peers, and suggests the way
forward for the UPR mechanism by reframing it as a forum of fighting for
borderline recommendations. The pursuit of the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations holds the potential to (1) turn the UPR mechanism into a
more functional, substantive, and effective forum and (2) bring about more
meaningful changes over time in human rights practices of SuRs by
reforming the approach to recommendations currently taken by
recommending states and other relevant stakeholders.
This article is based upon a few important premises. First, the article
acknowledges the difficulty in attributing the UPR as the deciding factor in
eventual decisions by SuRs to address certain human rights concerns.
Nonetheless, it argues that the acceptance of borderline recommendations
in itself will certainly increase the level of accountability and also expand
the space for intervention by their peers and other relevant stakeholders.
Second, as elaborated in a later section, the UPR is an inevitably political
mechanism that primarily relies upon voluntary commitments by SuRs to
recommendations given by their peers. Thus, such a political nature can
both inhibit and enhance the prospect for the improvement of human rights
situations on the ground. Third, the main focus of the article is on
recommendations. However, as some scholars have emphasized, what
arguably matters most is whether and to what extent SuRs actually
implement the recommendations.22 With the importance of implementation
in mind, the article argues that recommendations are equally (if not more)
important in the UPR process, as recommendations essentially create an
overall framework for the implementation phase and also dictate the quality
of a review cycle in an SuR. Fourth, the article understands that UPR
recommendations serve multiple purposes: they are not only genuinely
21

For the general theoretical framework, see, e.g., Herbert C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification,
and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 51 (1958); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,
54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). For the UPR-specific context, see e.g., Milewicz & Goodin, supra note 18, at
527-28; Damian Etone, Nigeria’s Engagement with the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic
Review: Potential for Acculturation or Risk of Regression?, 28 AFR. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 267, 28697 (2020).
22
See, e.g., Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN
Human Rights Council, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 204 (2009); Alex Conte, Reflections and Challenges:
Entering into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, 9 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 187,
201-02 (2011); Sarah H. Paoletti, Using the Universal Periodic Review to Advance Human Rights:
What Happens in Geneva Must Not Stay in Geneva, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 268, 277 (2011).
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geared towards actual improvements of human rights situations but also
symbolic, diplomatic, and political. And the article does not deny the
validity of recommendations that are designed for purposes other than
directly impacting human rights practices in SuRs. It only argues that such
recommendations do not represent the UPR’s unique value to the global
human rights regime. Finally, the article acknowledges that the UPR’s
added values go beyond the framework of recommendations and
implementation. Examples include increased exposure of human rights at
the international23 and national24 levels, stimulation of national dialogues,25
development of the most comprehensive mapping of human rights
situations in the world,26 restructuring of human rights monitoring
mechanisms at the national level,27 equal treatment of all UN member
states,28 and universal coverage of human rights.29 But it stresses that these
examples do not necessarily contribute directly to the improvement of
human rights practices on the ground.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Part one provides an
overview of the UPR mechanism and the relevant literature; Part two
introduces the Fight for Borderline Recommendations; Part three examines
the potential of the Fight for Borderline Recommendations through the
experiences of Lao PDR; Part four refers to other countries’ experiences
with the UPR to discuss the applicability of the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations at the broader level; and Part five concludes by
23
Roland Chauville, The Universal Periodic Review’s First Cycle: Successes and Failures, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM 87, 90 (Hilary
Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).
24
Laura K. Landolt, Externalizing Human Rights: From Commission to Council, the Universal
Periodic Review and Egypt, 14 HUM. RTS. REV. 107, 125 (2013); Walter Kälin, Ritual and Ritualism at
the Universal Periodic Review: A Preliminary Appraisal, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM 25, 36–37 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds.,
2014); Chauville, supra note 23, at 91.
25
See, e.g., Conte, supra note 22, at 201; OHCHR, U.N. POPULATION FUND, FROM COMMITMENT
TO ACTION ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS: LESSONS FROM THE SECOND CYCLE
OF THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 11–12 (2019), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pubpdf/UNFPA_PUB_2019_EN_Lessons_from_the_second_cycle_of_the_universal_periodic_review.pdf;
TISTOUNET, supra note 6, at 12.
26
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW IN ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15 (2016),
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/news/un_-_universal_periodic_review_-_march_2016_full.
pdf; TISTOUNET, supra note 6, at 12–13.
27
Gilmore et al., supra note 15, at 176.
28
See e.g., Chauville, supra note 23, at 87; GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note 13, at 3; Pilar
Elizalde, A Horizontal Pathway to Impact? An Assessment of the Universal Periodic Review, in
CONTESTING HUMAN RIGHTS: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICE 83, 89 (Alison Brysk & Michael
Stohl eds., 2019).
29
See e.g., Chauville, supra note 23, at 89.
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suggesting the way forward for the UPR mechanism in effectively pursuing
the Fight.
I.

OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW AND RELEVANT
LITERATURE
A. Universal Periodic Review

With 2021 marking the fifteenth year since its establishment, the
Universal Periodic Review is a relatively new human rights mechanism
within the United Nations system. It is universal because (1) all 193 UN
member states are expected to undertake such a review and (2) all human
rights are covered in the review.30 And it is periodic because the review
takes place every four and a half years for all member states.31 Unlike other
human rights monitoring mechanisms, such as treaty-based bodies and
Special Procedures which are commonly led by independent experts,32 “the
UPR is the only global forum where public scrutiny on states’ human rights
policies is carried out among peers.”33 And unlike other mechanisms that
have traditionally relied upon confrontational approaches such as naming
and shaming,34 the UPR was established as “a cooperative mechanism
based on objective and reliable information and on interactive dialogue.”35
Importantly, the UPR is also a mechanism that is designed to (1) “[b]e an
intergovernmental process, United Nations Member-driven and actionoriented,”36 (2) “[c]omplement and not duplicate other human rights

30

See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 3.
The periodicity of the review for the first review cycle was originally set at four years. See
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 14. However, it was subsequently extended to four and a half years for
the second review cycle and onwards. See HRC Res. 16/21, annex, Review of the Work and
Functioning of the Human Rights Council, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/21 (Mar. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter H.R.C. Res. 16/21].
32
See OHCHR, supra note 16.
33
Andrea Cofelice, Italy and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights
Council. Playing the Two-Level Game, 47 ITALIAN POL. SCI. REV. 227, 244 (2017). However, the idea
of periodic reviews of states’ human rights practices is nothing new to the United Nations, as the
Economic and Social Council established a similar mechanism in 1956. For more details, see Philip
Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human
Rights Council, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L. 185, 207-213 (2006). The idea of peer review has also been
developed by regional and international bodies such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, World
Trade Organization, and Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. Felice D. Gaer, A
Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
109, 114 (2007).
34
See generally Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, The Universal Periodic Review - Is There Life
Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation, 4 N.Z. L. REV. 673, 681-94 (2012).
35
H.R.C Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 3(b).
36
Id. ¶ 3(d).
31
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mechanisms,”37 and (3) “[n]ot be overly burdensome to the concerned state
or to the agenda of the Council.”38 Thus, it is clear that the UPR was
envisioned as a mechanism that is by design political and complementary,
with minimum imposition of additional work on member states.
Among the six core objectives of the UPR, the two most important are
arguably “[t]he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground”39
and “[t]he fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and
commitments and assessment of positive developments and challenges
faced by the state.”40 The scope of the review is set forth by five
instruments: the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, human rights instruments that states are party to,
voluntary pledges and commitments made by states, and applicable
international humanitarian law.41 That the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is included as part of the scope of the review is critical, as it ensures
the universal coverage of all fundamental rights and the equal treatment of
states regardless of the states’ level of treaty ratification.42 The HRC also
decided that “[t]he second and subsequent cycles of the review should
focus on, inter alia, the implementation of the accepted recommendations
and the developments of the human rights situation in the SuR.”43 Within
this scope, the actual review is based upon three documents: a twenty-page
national report, a ten-page compilation of United Nations documents
summarized by the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), and a ten-page compilation of stakeholder reports (i.e., reports
by NGOs, national human rights institutions, and other relevant
stakeholders) summarized by the OHCHR.44
The UPR essentially entails a three-stage process: (1) submission of
these three documents to the Council in preparation for the next review
session, (2) review in Geneva assessing the implementation status of
37

Id. ¶ 3(f).
Id. ¶ 3(h).
39
Id. ¶ 4(a).
40
Id. ¶ 4(b). See id., ¶ 4 for the rest of the objectives.
41
Id. ¶ 1.
42
Scholars have also emphasized the importance of including the UDHR as part of the UPR
process. See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 24, at 34 (arguing that it “is especially relevant for the more than
twenty-five states that have not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and whose performance in this area can be assessed through the lens of equivalent rights in the
Universal Declaration.”); Paoletti, supra note 22, at 269 (arguing in the U.S. context that “[t]he
declaration expands significantly beyond the U.S. Constitutional framework of civil and political rights
and incorporates the full range of economic, social, and cultural rights central to the realization of the
fundamental right to human dignity.”).
43
H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 31, ¶ 6.
44
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 15.
38
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accepted recommendations from the previous review cycle and adopting
recommendations for the next four and a half years, and (3) implementation
of accepted recommendations.45 The UPR Working Group, consisting of all
forty-seven member states of the HRC, conducts each review facilitated by
the troika (three member states selected by the drawing of lots).46 Forty-two
states are slated to undertake the review annually during three sessions of
the UPR Working Group while maintaining the same order of review
established during the first review cycle.47 The actual review is three and a
half hours,48 with seventy minutes reserved for the presentation, replies, and
concluding comments by SuRs, and 140 minutes reserved for interactive
dialogue in which states give an SuR recommendations to improve their
human rights practices.49 Observer states (i.e., UN member states that are
not HRC member states) may also take part in the interactive dialogue and
give recommendations to SuRs,50 thereby enabling a truly universal peer
review. Upon receiving recommendations from other states, SuRs have two
choices: either accepting/supporting51 or “noting” recommendations. The
HRC officially states that “[r]ecommendations that enjoy the support of the
state concerned will be identified as such [i.e., accepted/supported]. Other
recommendations, together with the comments of the state concerned
thereon, will be noted.”52 As such, the term “note/noting” officially
indicates that certain recommendations do not enjoy the support of SuRs.
In practice, the act of accepting/supporting and noting formalizes decisions
by SuRs to either implement or not implement recommendations,
45
See Conte, supra note 22, at 190; Dominguez-Redondo, supra note 34, at 675; Etone, supra note
21, at 268; U.N. POPULATION FUND, supra note 25, at 10.
46
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 18.
47
H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 31, ¶¶ 3-4. For the calendar of reviews for each cycle, see Cycles
of the Universal Periodic Review, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Cycles
UPR.aspx (last visited July 21, 2021).
48
Originally, the duration of the review was three hours. See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 22.
But given the increased participation by states in interactive dialogues, it was extended to three and a
half hours. HRC Dec. 17/119, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/17/119 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter H.R.C.
Dec. 17/119].
49
H.R.C. Dec. 17/119, supra note 48. See also UPR INFO, A GUIDE FOR RECOMMENDING STATES
AT THE UPR 8–9 (2015), https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/upr_info_
guide_for_recommending_states_2015.pdf.
50
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 18. HRC members are allowed three minutes of speaking time
and Observer states only two minutes. H.R.C. Dec. 17/119, supra note 48, ¶ 6. But if it is not possible
to accommodate all speakers within three and a half hours, each recommending states’ speaking time is
reduced to two minutes. Id.
51
Gayatri Patel, Smoke and Mirrors at the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review Process, 10
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. HEALTHCARE 310, 312 (2017) (noting that “the terminology for those
recommendations that were accepted has been changed to being ‘supported’”). This article uses both
terms “accept” and “support” interchangeably.
52
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 32.
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respectively, in that review cycle. In other words, while no
recommendations are officially rejected, the term “note/noting” in effect
signals a de facto rejection of recommendations.53 The troika prepares a
UPR Working Group report capturing all recommendations that were orally
given by recommending states.54 SuRs may respond to recommendations at
any time before the Working Group report is officially adopted at the next
plenary session of the HRC,55 which typically gives SuRs three to four
months to respond.56
B. What Universal Periodic Review Represents
Many stakeholders have attached importance and hope to the UPR
mechanism since its establishment,57 largely due to the failure of the HRC’s
predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter CHR). Despite
its major achievements,58 the CHR was harshly criticized, especially
towards the end of its existence, to the extent that “[f]ew states were really
willing to stand up for the Commission . . . [and] hardly any NGOs took up
the cause of the human rights body.”59 Selectivity was one of the central
issues facing the CHR: “during the Commission’s 60 years, one quarter of
its country-specific resolutions focused on Israel while not one resolution
dealt with human rights abuses in China.”60 Amnesty International similarly
pointed out the CHR’s failure to act on gross human rights violations in

53

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
HRC, Modalities and Practices for the Universal Periodic Review Process, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/PRST/1 (Apr. 9, 2008).
55
While most countries appear to have increasingly adopted the practice of responding to UPR
recommendations closer to the next HRC’s plenary session, a few countries such as Portugal have
continued responding to most recommendations immediately at the review session. See HRC, Rep. of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Portugal, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/7 (May 10,
2019).
56
The HRC holds three regular sessions in February to March, June to July, and September to
October each year. See Sessions of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Sessions.aspx (last visited July 21, 2021). The UPR Working Group organizes
review sessions generally in January, May, and November each year. See Cycles of the Universal
Periodic Review, OHCHR, supra note 47.
57
See supra notes 4-11.
58
The CHR essentially built the bedrock for the modern international human rights legal
framework through the development of key human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and core human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Eric Cox,
State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 6 J.
INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 87, 98 (2010).
59
Nico Schrijver, The UN Human Rights Council: A New Society of the Committed or Just Old
Wine in New Bottles?, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 809, 814 (2007).
60
Freedman, supra note 4, at 289-90.
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Uganda (1977), Iraq (1980s), Burundi (1994), and Algeria (1990s).61 The
fatal blow to the relevance of the CHR came when a series of issues over
its questionable membership emerged in the Commission’s last years, such
as the ousting of the United States in 2001,62 Sudan’s election in 2001 and
re-election in 2004,63 and Libya’s chairmanship in 2003.64 Recognizing
these issues, then-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in
his 2005 report that “the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has
been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and
professionalism”65 and thus proposed to replace the CHR with the HRC,66
which eventually came to fruition on March 15, 2006.67
Given this historical background, the establishment of the Universal
Periodic Review symbolized an important beginning for the global human
rights regime to address the issues that plagued the CHR. In fact, Annan
argued in 2005 that a peer review mechanism based upon “the notion of
universal scrutiny . . . of all member states in regard to all human rights
commitments . . . would help avoid, to the extent possible, the politicization
and selectivity that are hallmarks of the Commission’s existing system.”68
Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, echoed that
“the Commission’s ability to address issues of human rights concern at the
national level is demonstrably deficient” and that “were it to be done
against a backdrop of universal scrutiny, [dangers of selectivity and
politicization] might be minimized.”69 In other words, through its
cooperative approach, the UPR was designed to embark on the ambitious
project of depoliticization and restore the international community’s faith
in the global human rights monitoring mechanism by requiring all UN
member states to undergo periodic reviews “in an objective, transparent,
non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized
manner.”70

61

Amnesty Int’l, Meeting the Challenge: Transforming the Commission on Human Rights into a
Human Rights Council, AI Index IOR 40/008/2005 (April 26, 2005).
62
Ghanea, supra note 4, at 699; Alston, supra note 33, at 191-192.
63
Alston, supra note 33, at 192-193.
64
Id. at 192.
65
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
for All, ¶ 182, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
66
Id. ¶ 183.
67
G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 1 (Mar. 15, 2006).
68
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 8, ¶ 8.
69
Louise Arbour, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Statement on the Closure of the 61st Session
of the Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 22, 2005), https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=5807&LangID=E.
70
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 3(g).
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Accordingly, many stakeholders believe that the UPR essentially
dictates the fate of the HRC. A scholar argues that “[t]he UPR’s importance
within the HRC lies not only in its function, but also in its symbolic value.
How it fares, and how credibly its work is viewed, will impact considerably
on perceptions of the HRC more broadly.”71 A practitioner similarly
contends that,
[t]he key determinant of whether the HRC represents an improvement over the
Commission is the UPR. If the UPR functions well this may outweigh the
losses in other areas but if it does not, there can be little doubt that the
institutional design of the Council does not represent a marked improvement
over that of its predecessor.72

For some, the UPR represents a hope for further improvements of
human rights practices on the ground as it “provides an unprecedented
opportunity to routinely hold all states to account for their obligations
under international human rights law to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights . . . .”73
C. Universal Periodic Review in Reality
So has the UPR lived up to such expectations? While this question is
challenging to answer succinctly, the general sense is that the UPR has
yielded promising results in its first fifteen years. To date, the UPR
Working Group has conducted three rounds of reviews for a majority of
states, with the first review cycle spanning from 2008 to 2011, the second
from 2012 to 2016, and the third from 2017 to 2022.74 It is remarkable that
all 193 UN member states have taken part in the reviews although
engagement in the UPR is voluntary,75 which means that “[f]or the first
71
Edward R. McMahon, Herding Cats and Sheep: Assessing State and Regional Behavior in the
Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 2010 UPR INFO 1,
5,
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/-mcmahon_herding_cats_and_
sheeps_july_2010.pdf [hereinafter “McMahon, Herding Cats”].
72
MEGHNA ABRAHAM, BUILDING THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS
OF THE INSTITUTION-BUILDING YEAR 5, 45 (2007).
73
Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 7, at 537.
74
See HRC, Cycles of the Universal Periodic Review, supra note 47. As of May 2021, the UPR
Working Group has completed 12 out of 14 review sessions, which leaves 14 more states in November
2021 and 12 more in January/February 2022 to undertake their third review. Id.
75
The only country that had its review postponed under the first cycle was Haiti but only because
of an earthquake. See HRC, The Support of the HRC to the Recovery Process in Haiti After the
Earthquake of January 12, 2010: A Human Rights Approach, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-13/L.1 (Jan.
27, 2010). Haiti subsequently took part in its first review on October 13, 2011. HRC, Rep. of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Haiti, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/19 (Oct. 17, 2011).
Israel boycotted its second UPR review scheduled in January 2013 and eventually undertook the review
in October 2013. See Elizalde, supra note 28, at 91-92.
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time in the history of the UN, every state now has access to a forum in
which it can consider and discuss the human rights performance of every
other state.”76 To indicate states’ increased interest in this mechanism, the
number of recommendations has steadily grown over the three review
cycles: the first review cycle saw a total of 21,355 recommendations, the
second 36,338 recommendations, and the third 29,069 recommendations so
far, without including the last four review sessions (thus most likely
reaching 40,000 recommendations in total),77 meaning that each state has
received on average more than 200 recommendations in the third cycle.
Despite valid concerns over the UPR also embodying “a mutual praise
society”78 (in which states allegedly engage in the practice of blindly
praising each other’s human rights practices while potentially disregarding
serious violations or non-protection of fundamental rights), these statistics
at least indicate that the UPR has been more than a mere diplomatic forum
with little intent for substantive changes: action-oriented recommendations
have consistently accounted for more than 70% of the total
recommendations in each of the first three review cycles.79 Specifically,
“general action” recommendations account for roughly 40% and “specific
action” recommendations about 35%.80 In contrast, “minimal action” and
76

GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note 13, at 18.
Database, UPR INFO, https://upr-info-database.uwazi.io/en/library (filter by “Recommendations”
or select the “Recommendations” hyperlink) (last visited July 2, 2021) [hereinafter UPR INFO,
Database]. UPR Info, a Geneva-based non-governmental organization, manages a comprehensive
database on the UPR. With the most recent five sessions included in the database averaging more than
3,000 recommendations, the last four sessions of the third cycle would most likely amount to a range of
10,000 – 12,000. Precaution is warranted to better understand acceptance and implementation rates
derived from this database. UPR Info counts the number of recommendations based on the number of
countries issuing them. Hence, it treats recommendations that are worded exactly the same but are
issued by, suppose, four different countries as four different recommendations. This approach certainly
affects acceptance and implementation rates: the more recommendations SuRs receive, accept, and
implement on one particular issue, the higher the acceptance and implementation rates become. In
contrast, as evident from any reports cited in this article, UPR Working Group reports count the number
of recommendations based on the content and thus considers similarly or identically worded
recommendations as only one recommendation.
78
UN WATCH, MUTUAL PRAISE SOCIETY: COUNTRY SCORECARD AND EVALUATION OF THE
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW SYSTEM OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (2009), https://unwatch.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Mutual-Praise-Society.pdf. See also Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, Of
Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations
Human Rights Council, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009) (expressing concerns that the UPR could turn
into “‘a mutual admiration society’ where serious and genuine human rights dialogue will be replaced
by back patting and mutual congratulation.”).
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See UPR INFO, Database, supra note 77.
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Id. Studies on UPR recommendations generally refer to five categories of recommendations
developed by McMahon: minimal action (typically phrased as “request,” “share,” and “seek”),
continuing action (“continue” and “maintain”), considering action (“consider,” “explore,” and “reflect
on”), general action (“strengthen,” “encourage,” “ensure,” and “take steps towards”), and specific
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“continuing action” recommendations accounted for only 18% of total
recommendations (1% and 17%, respectively).81 Furthermore, the
acceptance rate has been consistently high, around 75% for each review
cycle,82 despite the fact that it is entirely up to SuRs to accept or note
recommendations.83
Of course, the high acceptance rate means little if accepted
recommendations are not implemented. Several studies indicate that SuRs
indeed take accepted recommendations seriously. Despite concerns and
criticisms that the UPR is a “toothless” mechanism,84 one study noted that,
albeit based upon national reports, about 70% of accepted
recommendations were implemented in the first cycle (50% fully and 20%
partially), whereas only 25% were not implemented.85 Another study
gathered information from not only states but also civil society
organizations, national human rights institutions, and UN agencies, and
found that about 50% of recommendations were either partially or fully
implemented within two and a half years after the review.86 Importantly,
this study also pointed out that almost 20% of noted recommendations were
also fully or partially implemented in the same time span.87 Yet another
study divided up countries into top, middle, and poor human rights
performers and observed (1) that all states do accept a significant amount
action (“develop,” “establish,” “enforce,” “ratify,” and “implement”). For more details, see McMahon,
Herding Cats, supra note 71, at 7-9; see also McMahon & Ascherio, supra note 12, at 235-36.
81
See UPR INFO, Database, supra note 77.
82
Id. The total acceptance rate over the three cycles is 74% (64,222 recommendations accepted out
of 86,762); the first cycle 73% (15,634 out of 21,355); the second cycle 73% (26,697 out of 36,338);
and the third cycle 75% (21,891 out of 29,069).
83
Recall that the HRC stipulates that “[r]ecommendations that enjoy the support of the state
concerned will be identified as such [i.e., accepted/supported]. Other recommendations, together with
the comments of the state concerned thereon, will be noted,” thereby leaving the decision to
accept/support or note recommendations to SuRs. See supra note 3, ¶ 32.
84
See e.g., Olivier de Frouville, Building a Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights:
The Way Forward, in NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: WHAT FUTURE
FOR THE UN TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PROCEDURES? 241, 253 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & William A. Schabas eds., 2011) (finding it “very doubtful that the UPR can be of
any use in the case of those who are not really willing to participate and who only will be striving to
escape criticism as much as they can”); UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra note 13, at 75 (expressing
concerns that “while the UPR has thus far proven to be a cooperative mechanism, its Achilles heel lies
in the will of the states to participate in the mechanism and to implement the recommendations.
Lacklustre participation and, worse, persistent noncooperation weaken the potential of this
mechanism.”).
85
GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note 13, at 6.
86
UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra note 13, at 14.
87
Id. at 29-30. Relatedly, UPR Info reports that Denmark became the first country in the UPR
process to change its position on recommendations and accept 20 initially noted recommendations in
the mid-term. Denmark Accepts 20 New Recommendations at Mid-Term UPR INFO, (June 25, 2014),
https://www.upr-info.org/en/news/denmark-accepts-20-new-recommendations-mid-term.

77

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

of specific recommendations, although the bottom group accepted roughly
a third of such recommendations88 and (2) that the bottom group “showed
the greatest progress” between the first and second review cycles.89
Despite these encouraging early signs, the UPR has also faced a series
of challenges and issues. First, while successfully subjecting all UN
member states to peer scrutiny, the UPR appears to have continued to
suffer from the issues of selectivity and politicization that eventually led to
the demise of the CHR. It is perhaps no coincidence that the United States
received the most recommendations in the first review cycle and that
countries such as Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba gave the most
recommendations (19, 16, 14, respectively), amounting to roughly 18% of
the total recommendations that the United States received from a total of 56
countries in the first cycle.90 Venezuela’s recommendations to the United
States accounted for nearly a quarter of the total recommendations it gave
to other states during this cycle, thereby clearly demonstrating the ongoing
issue of selectivity.91 One example that indicates the continuing issue of
politicization is Egypt’s decision to accept Bangladesh’s recommendation
to “continue its ongoing review of national laws to ensure that they are in
line with its international human rights law obligations,” but to reject a
similar recommendation by Israel: “conduct a wide ranging review of
Egyptian human rights laws in order to bring them into line with Egypt’s
international commitments, as so pledged in its HRC candidature and
within its National Report.”92 An empirical study also shows that a majority
of study participants who are involved in the UPR process believe (1) that
UPR recommendations are either always (4.5%) or often (61.4%)
politicized93 and (2) that the UPR either always (9.1%) or often (52.3%)
manifests country bias.94 Some attendees of the UPR sessions have
observed issues such as filibuster by friendly states,95 politicization of
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Milewicz & Goodin, supra note 18, at 523.
Id. at 524.
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See UPR INFO, Database, supra note 77.
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Id.
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Conte, supra note 22, at 196.
93
Valentina Carraro, The United Nations Treaty Bodies and Universal Periodic Review:
Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization?, 39 HUM. RTS. Q. 943, 952 (2017).
94
Id. at 953-54.
95
Sweeney and Saito observed that reviews of Bahrain and Tunisia were dominated by their allies
“filling the speakers’ list to compliment the SuR.” Sweeney & Saito, supra note 22, at 210; Freedman
also observed similar patterns over different sessions. Freedman, supra note 4, at 306-309. See also
Abebe, supra note 78, at 19 (pointing out that “states belonging to similar regional groupings often
make statements praising the human rights situation in the SuR, a problem which, also shared by
western countries, is too often manifested among non-western countries.”).
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recommendations,96 and regionalism.97 It is no surprise then that some
scholars are skeptical of the UPR’s political nature.98 But importantly,
others find the UPR’s political nature to be one of its strengths. For
instance, one scholar argues that the UPR’s political nature actually “helps
to increase the willingness of states to seriously commit to the review in
order to avoid ‘losing face’ with political allies.”99 Other scholars similarly
argue that “[i]f the UPR ‘matters,’ it is likely due to these political
interactions, not because the process approximates an independent or
impartial assessment of human rights.”100 Thus, the studies remain
inconclusive as to whether the UPR’s political nature inhibits or enhances
its functioning.
Second, many researchers have identified various issues with UPR
recommendations. For instance, the Center for Economic and Social
Rights, an international NGO, cautioned that recommending states have
focused disproportionately on civil and political rights (almost 40%) and
much less on economic, social, and cultural rights (17%), thereby
jeopardizing one of the UPR’s core aims: “to promote the universality,
interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights.”101
The vague nature of some recommendations also poses a problem for
implementation, perhaps best exemplified by Saudi Arabia’s
recommendation to Morocco: “continue its achievements in the field of
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Freedman, supra note 4, at 309-10; For instance, when Ecuador received a recommendation on
sexual discrimination (to which Ecuador did not have any objection), Egypt used the occasion to
underscore that sexual orientation fell outside the scope of the UPR in an attempt to avoid related
recommendations to be given to itself or its allies. Sweeney & Saito, supra note 22, at 212.
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For instance, African states as well as Latin American and Asian countries to a lesser extent
“stuck to dialogues on their respective regional groups.” Freedman, supra note 4, at 308.
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See, e.g., de Frouville, supra note 84, at 254 (arguing that “[i]t is obviously very difficult for a
political entity [i.e., the UPR] to address legal norms, as the interpretation it will give of those norms
will always be oriented by extra-legal considerations and in particular, as far as states are concerned, by
their national interest.”); Manfred Nowak, It’s Time for a World Court of Human Rights, in NEW
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: WHAT FUTURE FOR THE UN TREATY BODY
SYSTEM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PROCEDURES? 17, 23 (M. Cherif Bassouni & William A.
Schabas eds., 2011) (arguing that the UPR “suffers from the disadvantage that States’ performance in
the field of human rights is assessed by other states rather than by independent experts.”).
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Carraro, supra note 93, at 967. See also Dominguez-Redondo, supra note 34, at 706 (arguing
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rights monitoring mechanism is led by states rather than by expert bodies.”).
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Rochelle Terman & Erik Voeten, The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the
Universal Periodic Review, 13 REV. INT’L ORGS. 1, 3 (2018).
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CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RTS. [CESR], THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: A SKEWED
AGENDA? TRENDS ANALYSIS OF THE UPR’S COVERAGE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 2 (2016), https://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/CESR_ScPo_UPR_FINAL.pdf.
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human rights.”102 Kälin, a longtime UN official, points out the issue of too
many “soft” recommendations to avoid any confrontations: more than half
of recommendations in the first review cycle focused on relatively noncontroversial issues such as treaty ratification, women’s rights, and
children’s rights.103 McMahon, a prominent UPR researcher, similarly
found that the more specific the recommendations are, the more likely they
are to be rejected: almost all recommendations entailing minimum action
(98%) or continuing action (90%) were accepted, whereas only 47% of
“specific action” recommendations were accepted.104 Given this context,
some view the whole UPR process as rather “superficial.”105 The way the
troika and the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights cluster
recommendations can be also problematic: they have combined similar, yet
subtly differently worded, recommendations into one recommendation in
certain cases, thereby potentially obscuring some recommendations that
SuRs may have accepted if not clustered with others. For instance, when
Lao PDR received recommendations on ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the troika and the Office of High
Commissioner for Human Rights clustered recommendations such as
“[c]onsider acceding to or ratifying the Second Optional Protocol to
[ICCPR],” “[s]tep up efforts to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to
[ICCPR],” and “[r]atify the Second Optional Protocol to [ICCPR], aiming
at the abolition of the death penalty, considering Sustainable Development
Goal 16” as the same recommendation, even though these
recommendations may not necessarily entail the same follow-up actions.106
Third, the UPR mechanism has also faced issues with implementation.
Many scholars have pointed out the lack of systematic follow-up
mechanisms both at global and national levels, leaving the four and a half
years of the implementation period largely unmonitored by the HRC and
the UPR Working Group.107 As the UPR is primarily based upon three
102

Christina Szurlej, Universal Periodic Review: A Step in the Right Direction? 70-71 (July 2013)
(Ph.D. thesis, Middlesex University) (Middlesex University Research Repository), https://eprints.mdx.
ac.uk/13763 (last visited May 27, 2021).
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McMahon, Herding Cats, supra note 71, at 18.
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Patel, supra note 51, at 310 (emphasis added).
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See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, ¶ 115.2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/6 (Jan. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Lao PDR’s 3rd
Report].
107
See e.g., Joanna Harrington, Canada, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and Universal
Periodic Review, 18 CONST. F. 79, 88 (2009); UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra note 13, at 13;
Cofelice, supra note 33, at 248; Mizanie A. Tadesse, Ethiopia and the Universal Periodic Review
Mechanism: A Critical Reflection, 28 J. ETHIOPIAN L. 23, 56-57 (2016-2017); Chauville, supra note 23,
at 96. Given this issue, the HRC has encouraged states to submit mid-term progress reports, but it
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documents prepared by governments, United Nations, and other relevant
stakeholders, researchers have also faced methodological and analytical
challenges in assessing the implementation status precisely. Australia is a
good example in this regard: while the Government claimed that it has
either fully or partially implemented more than 130 out of 137 accepted
recommendations in its second review cycle,108 the Australian Human
Rights Commission countered that “10% of those accepted (in whole or in
part) have been fully implemented over the past four years . . . [but] a
further 62% have been partially implemented.”109 Reporting poses another
issue for measuring the degree of implementation, as many states do not
report the progress on every recommendation and pledge in their national
reports.110 In terms of the actual implementation, one study found that even
if they are accepted, politically sensitive recommendations were much less
likely to be implemented,111 which further indicates the UPR’s superficial
nature. Thus, this study raises a concern that “once states have
implemented ‘low-hanging fruit’ recommendations over the course of the
first and second cycles, progress with implementation will become
progressively more difficult.”112
D. Why States Comply with UPR Mechanism
Despite the above challenges and issues, it is clear that the UPR
carries significance for UN member states: otherwise, why wouldn’t states
either reject all recommendations or accept all of them but not implement
them? Why have they accepted more than 70% of all recommendations and
either fully or partially implemented more than half of accepted and 20%
of noted recommendations? This article argues that the power of
acculturation and peer pressure serves as a primary (but certainly not

remains “on a voluntary basis.” H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 31, ¶ 18. As of June 2021, 78 states have
submitted mid-term reports either in one or multiple review cycles. See UPR Mid-Term Reports,
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108
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109
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110
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exclusive) motivating factor for states to commit themselves to the UPR
mechanism.
Prominent human rights scholars, Goodman and Jinks, define
acculturation as “the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral
patterns of the surrounding culture.”113 Acculturation induces behavioral
changes through cognitive (internal) and social (external) pressures.
Cognitive pressures constitute “social-psychological costs of
nonconformity” and “social-psychological benefits of conforming to group
norms and expectations.”114 From this perspective, individuals’ identities
and social roles play a critical role in adjusting their behaviors. The logic
follows that “once actors internalize some role (or any other identity
formation), they are impelled to act and think in ways consistent with the
highly legitimated purposes and attributes of that role.” 115 Social pressures
compel individuals to strategically calculate social-psychological costs of
non-conformity vis-à-vis social-psychological benefits of conformity. The
natural inclination is that “actors hoard social legitimacy and social status,
and they minimize social disapproval.”116 The likelihood of conformity
increases as (1) “the importance of the group to the target actor
increases,”117 (2) “the target actor’s exposure to the group increases,”118 and
(3) “the size of the reference group increases.”119
Etone, a human rights scholar conducting extensive research on the
UPR, applies the concept of acculturation to the UPR mechanism arguing
that “[t]he cornerstone principles of the UPR – universality and cooperation
– can be effective in harnessing the social and cognitive pressures
associated with acculturation which can facilitate the social learning
process of states as they engage with the UPR process.”120 What is
important in this regard is for states to stay engaged in this universal and
cooperative mechanism and continue interacting with other states, which,
in itself, will induce behavioral changes and adjustments through both
cognitive and social pressures. Etone thus believes that even soft
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Goodman & Jinks, supra note 21, at 638.
Id. at 640.
115
Id. at 641.
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Id.
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Id. at 642.
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Id.
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Id. Goodman and Jinks also clarify that “group size is positively correlated with social
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ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2002), at 275-77).
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recommendations can pave the way for gradually transforming state
behaviors and positions on sensitive matters.121 For instance, he argues that
“[t]here may be an African way for realizing the rights of sexual minorities
within the context of the UPR by focusing on recommendations that seek to
transform the social and political culture in relation to sexual minorities.”122
That the UPR is a peer review mechanism is critical in this regard, as
it elicits a sense of belonging for all states that they would like to remain
part of without creating an “us v. them” dichotomy observed by scholars in
traditional, expert-led human rights mechanisms.123 Kälin, for instance,
argues that “within the framework of UPR, states that have promised to
their peers to accept and implement certain recommendations face
expectations that they will at least take steps towards implementation.”124
Tistounet, Head of HRC Branch at the UN Office of High Commissioner
for Human Rights, believes that SuRs end up accepting more
recommendations than initially anticipated as they “often feel the pressure
of supporting at least the same percentage of recommendations as their
neighbors or members of the groups they belong to.”125 In other words,
states take the UPR mechanism seriously precisely because they wish to
“avoid ‘losing face’ with political allies.”126 Even if they are rhetorical
commitments, recommendations once accepted could constitute what Elster
calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” as individuals generally adhere to
what they have committed to publicly.127 Thus, Conte, former
Representative to the UN for the International Commission of Jurists,
argues that precisely because SuRs publicly acknowledge their acceptance
of recommendations made by their peers, they cannot easily dismiss such
121
Damian Etone, Theoretical Challenges to Understanding the Potential Impact of the Universal
Periodic Review Mechanism: Revisiting Theoretical Approaches to State Human Rights Compliance,
18 J. HUM. RTS. 36, 50 (2019).
122
Id.
123
See e.g., id. at 50 (arguing that “[a]cculturation particularly favors the UPR mechanism because
it is based on peer review and not configured to involve a selected group of insiders or experts
examining or reviewing those considered as outsiders or states. This helps to dispel the perception of us
versus them.”).
124
Kälin, supra note 24, at 38.
125
TISTOUNET, supra note 6, at 12. As an indication, most Western European countries accepted
recommendations in the second review cycle at a similar percentage: Belgium (76%), France (82%),
Germany (85%), Portugal (89%), Spain (81%), whereas others such as Switzerland (67%) and United
Kingdom (66%) accepted a somewhat lower percentage of recommendations. One of the exceptions in
the region is the Netherlands which accepted only 38% of total recommendations. UPR INFO, Database,
supra note 77. See also supra note 100, an empirical study suggesting that states are more likely to
accept recommendations from allies.
126
Carraro, supra note 93, at 967.
127
Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 111 (Jon
Elster ed., 1998).
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recommendations, which in turn “empowers civil society and the
international community to hold states to their word.”128
In other words, the power of peer pressure and acculturation creates
pressure to both accept and implement recommendations. SuRs accept a
relatively substantial number of recommendations because they feel
cognitive and/or social pressures to do so. Social-psychological costs of
non-conformity are significant in the UPR context, as all members that
SuRs consider as their peers are part of such a forum. The likelihood of
conformity is also great in the UPR because “the importance of the group
to the target actor,” “the target actor’s exposure to the group,” and “the size
of the reference group” are all high.129 Even if they do not accept certain
recommendations immediately, the acculturation process may induce SuRs
to take necessary actions to eventually accept such recommendations. And
once they accept recommendations, SuRs will be held accountable by civil
society, other states, UN agencies, and other relevant stakeholders for
eventually implementing them, even if the acceptance was initially meant
to be rhetorical.
E. Studies on UPR
Despite the significance attached to the UPR, it is conspicuously
under-examined in United States legal scholarship.130 But the literature on
the UPR elsewhere has been rapidly developing, especially considering that
the UPR was established only fifteen years ago. Some have viewed UPRs
as ritualized events that UN member states go through on a regular basis,131
examined the roles of civil society,132 conducted country- and region-
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Universal Periodic Review on China, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 39 (2016-2017); Jonathan
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TRANSNAT’L L. 131, 137 (2020).
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RITUALISM (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).
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specific studies,133 and focused on specific rights and issues.134 Others have
discussed the process of developing national reports135 and stakeholder
reports,136 studied the relations between the UPR and treaty bodies,137 and
compared the UPR with other peer-review mechanisms.138 Notwithstanding
differences in their analytical focuses, a majority of the literature has
largely addressed questions such as whether and to what extent the UPR
has improved human rights on the ground, and how it could function
better.139 Hence (as is the case for this article), the primary focus of the
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 421 (2017); THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: CIVIL
SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES (James Gomez & Robin Ramcharan eds., 2018).
133
See generally Harrington, supra note 107; de la Vega & Yamasaki, supra note 14, at 213;
Natalie Baird, The Universal Periodic Review: Building a Bridge between the Pacific and Geneva?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM 187 (Hilary
Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014); Landolt, supra note 24; Damian Etone, African States:
Themes Emerging from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, 62 J. AFR. L. 201
(2018); Alan Desmond, The Triangle That Could Square the Circle? The UN International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the EU and the
Universal Periodic Review, 17 EUR. J. MIG. & L. 39 (2015); Cofelice, supra note 33; Ranbir Singh,
India and the Universal Periodic Review, 2012, 1 J. NAT’L L. U. DELHI 135 (2013); Björn Ahl, The
Rise of China and International Human Rights Law, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 637 (2015); Jonathan T. Chow,
North Korea’s Participation in the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights, 71 AUSTL. J. INT’L
AFF. 146 (2017).
134
See generally Eric S. Tars & Deodonne Bhattarai, Opening the Door to the Human Right to
Housing: The Universal Periodic Review and Strategic Federal Advocacy for a Rights-Based Approach
to Housing, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 197 (2011); Frederick Cowell & Angelina Milon,
Decriminalisation of Sexual Orientation Through the Universal Periodic Review, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
341 (2012); Gayatri Patel, How Universal Is the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review? An
Examination of the Discussions Held on Female Genital Mutilation in the First Cycle of Review, 12
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 187 (2017); Raymond Saner, Angad Keith & Lichia Yiu, Labour
Rights as Human Rights: Evaluating the Policy Coherence of USA, EU and Australia through Trade
Agreements and Their Participation in the Universal Periodic Review, 7 TRADE L. & DEV. 195 (2015);
Judith Bueno de Mesquita, The Universal Periodic Review: A Valuable New Procedure for the Right to
Health?, 21 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 263 (2019); Noelle Higgins, Creating a Space for Indigenous
Rights: the Universal Periodic Review as a Mechanism for Promoting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
23 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 125 (2019).
135
See, e.g., Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan, The Process of Viet Nam’s Preparation of the National Report
under the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, 17 ASIA-PAC. J. ON
HUM. RTS. & L. 102 (2016); Zewdu Mengesha Bashahider, Ethiopia’s Human Rights Report to
Universal Periodic Review (UPR): A Critical Overview of Its Preparation, 6 COGENT SOC. SCI. (2020).
136
See, e.g., Julie Billaud, Keepers of the Truth: Producing ‘Transparent’ Documents for the
Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND
RITUALISM 63 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).
137
See, e.g., Heather Collister, Rituals and Implementation in the Universal Periodic Review and
the Human Rights Treaties Bodies, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW:
RITUALS AND RITUALISM 87 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).
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See, e.g., Edward R. McMahon et al., Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic Review
of the UN Human Rights Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism, 12 AFR. & ASIAN STUD.
266 (2013).
139
See, e.g., Jane K. Cowan, The Universal Periodic Review as a Public Audit Ritual: An
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literature on the UPR has been on recommendations and implementation,
although empirical studies on the implementation of UPR
recommendations remain thin.140
Studies on recommendations have focused on the analysis of various
statistics141 as well as the scope142 and legal status143 of recommendations.
Some have pursued policy-oriented studies addressing how to improve the
wording and quality of recommendations.144 Others have raised a number of
issues with recommendations in terms of the focus,145 the scope,146 the lack
of diligence in developing recommendations,147 recommending states
giving recommendations that they have not themselves addressed
sufficiently,148 and recommending states not following up on their own
recommendations given to certain SuRs in the next review cycle.149
The focus of this article is on one area of UPR recommendations that
has yet to be articulated in the relevant literature: borderline
recommendations (i.e., recommendations that SuRs accepted but have yet
to implement or have noted but showed interests to engage with). To be
clear, some literature has emphasized the importance of noted
recommendations and pointed out that noted recommendations have been
implemented by SuRs.150 In particular, UPR Info stresses that (1) “[n]oted

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: RITUALS AND RITUALISM 42, 44 (Hilary
Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).
140
Valentina Carraro, Promoting Compliance with Human Rights: The Performance of the United
Nations’ Universal Periodic Review and Treaty Bodies, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 1079, 1080 (2019). For
notable studies on the implementation at the international level, see GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note
13; UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra note 13; UPR INFO, ON THE ROAD TO IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 110; Milewicz & Goodin, supra note 18.
141
See, e.g., McMahon, Herding Cats, supra note 71; EDWARD R. MCMAHON, THE UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW: A WORK IN PROGRESS – AN EVALUATION OF THE FIRST CYCLE OF THE NEW UPR
MECHANISM OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 26 (2012), https://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/genf/09297.pdf [hereinafter THE UPR: A WORK IN PROGRESS].
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See, e.g., Shah & Sivakumaran, supra note 12.
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See, e.g., Frederick Cowell, Understanding the Legal Status of Universal Periodic Review
Recommendations, 7 CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. 164 (2018).
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See e.g., Sarah Tufano, The “Holy Trinity” of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review:
How to Make an Effective Recommendation Regarding Women’s Rights, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
187 (2018); Conte, supra note 22; UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra notes 13 and 110; THE UPR: A
WORK IN PROGRESS, supra note 141.
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See generally CESR, supra note 101.
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See generally Shah & Sivakumaran, supra note 12; Szurlej, supra note 102.
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See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 24, at 32.
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See, e.g., id. at 35-36.
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Mao & Sheng, supra note 130, at 13-14.
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See, e.g., GUJADHUR & LIMON, supra note 13, at 6, 38; Mao & Sheng, supra note 130, at 29-30;
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, supra note 25, at 31-32.
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recommendations can be accepted at a later stage, such as the next UPR”151
and (2) “[i]f we do not work on the noted recommendations, it could
become a carte blanche allowing certain states to ignore the most
meaningful recommendations (in terms of improvement of human rights
for its citizens).”152 UPR Info also argues that as “[r]ejected
recommendations remain legitimate concerns for all . . . the states [should]
explain why they reject recommendations suggested by the international
community.”153 Yet UPR Info and other researchers have primarily focused
on the fact that SuRs implement noted recommendations, thus not
necessarily grappling with the question of how recommending states and
other relevant stakeholders can engage SuRs in the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations.
II. FIGHT FOR BORDERLINE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. UPR as Not About Acceptance and Implementation Rates
The high acceptance rate and the relatively high implementation rate
are indeed encouraging signs that SuRs take the UPR mechanism seriously.
That 19% of noted recommendations have triggered some action154 further
cements the legitimacy and relevance of the UPR, as well as the
commitment to this mechanism by SuRs. However, as the above literature
indicates, the UPR’s unique value cannot be measured by acceptance and
implementation rates alone. Imagine that an SuR receives and accepts all
recommendations, thus presenting a 100% acceptance rate, but that those
recommendations mostly constitute minimum and continuing actions as to
“strengthen regional and international cooperation in the field of human
rights,” “continue constructive cooperation with treaty bodies and the
special procedures,” and “take further measures to raise awareness and
understanding of human rights.”155 Most SuRs would not have any issues
implementing all of these recommendations, thus boasting a 100%
implementation rate. But does this substantively contribute to achieving the
UPR’s ultimate objective of improving human rights situations on the
151
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PDR 3rd UPR, supra note 106, ¶ 115. Unsurprisingly, Lao PDR accepted all these recommendations.
See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Addendum, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/6/Add.1 (Sept. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Lao PDR 3rd
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ground? Recall that (1) SuRs have accepted almost 100% of
recommendations leading to minimum action and 90% of
recommendations asking for continuing action, whereas they have accepted
less than half of specific action-oriented recommendations,156 and (2) the
more difficult and sensitive the accepted recommendations are, the less
likely they will be implemented.157 In other words, one cannot deny that
states tend to opt for “low-hanging fruit” in their UPR recommendations
and subsequent implementation.158 Rather, this article argues that
acceptance and implementation rates in themselves do not serve as a useful
indicator to measure the UPR’s added value.
Neither does the UPR’s added value lie in introducing
recommendations on which SuRs hold predetermined positions. For
instance, there are many recommendations that an SuR may have no
problems accepting because these recommendations either require minimal
action, entail non-threatening consequences, point to ongoing actions on
behalf of the SuR, are aligned with the policies of the SuR, or are beneficial
for the SuR to advance national interests and improve diplomatic relations
with other States. In contrast, there are politically sensitive
recommendations that an SuR may simply reject as deviating from their
local contexts (e.g., death penalty, sexual orientation, and religious
freedom). For instance, Lao PDR has unsurprisingly accepted and
implemented recommendations to “continue its policies and efforts to
enhance the solidarity and equality among its multi-ethnic population,”
“continue efforts on public administration reforms,” and “focus efforts on
successfully achieving improvements in the judicial system.”159 On the
other hand, in each of its three reviews, Lao PDR has consistently noted all
recommendations related to the death penalty, ratification of optional
protocols for core human rights treaties, adoption of legislation that
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Republic, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/5 (May 6, 2010) [hereinafter Lao PDR 1st UPR]. In its national
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prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,
and amendment of legislation that allegedly restricts freedom of
expression, assembly and association.160
This is not to suggest that recommending states drop both “easy” and
“sensitive” recommendations. After all, the UPR is a political mechanism:
friendly states may continue issuing “easy” recommendations to maintain
collegial relations with an SuR, and states upholding high human rights
standards may continue to challenge SuRs with “sensitive”
recommendations to improve their human rights practices. Especially with
the latter, the power of peer pressure and acculturation may induce
behavioral changes in the SuR in the long term. Still, the UPR likely does
not act as the primary driver for implementing either category of
recommendations, but rather constitutes only part of a much larger driving
force for such changes.
If this analysis is true, where does the UPR’s unique value lie as far as
recommendations are concerned? The Fight for Borderline
Recommendations framework suggests that it lies somewhere between
these opposite ends of the spectrum: that is, recommendations that an SuR
would not have accepted and/or implemented without the “extra push”
provided by the UPR mechanism.
B. Rationale for UPR as a Forum of Fighting for Borderline
Recommendations
The rationale for framing the UPR as a forum of fighting for
borderline recommendations is to put a spotlight on borderline
recommendations with which SuRs have hinted their willingness to at least
engage with identified human rights concerns, however subtle of an
indication that may be. In other words, the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations essentially shifts the attention of scholars, practitioners,
activists, and states alike to exploring ways to commit SuRs to accepting
and implementing “softer” recommendations that are designed to leverage
them into eventually accepting and implementing more “sensitive” or
controversial recommendations through the acculturation process. The
UPR would add little value to the existing global human rights machinery
if it is incapable of inducing SuRs to accept some of these “sensitive”
recommendations. Otherwise, it will indeed turn into “a mutual praise
160
See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/5/Add.1 (Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Lao
PDR’s 1st UPR add.]; HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao
People’s Democratic Republic: Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/7/Add.1 (June 23, 2015) [hereinafter
Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add.]; Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR add., supra note 155.
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society”161 in which accepting and implementing recommendations would
hardly contribute to the improvement of human rights practices within the
SuR in a meaningful way. In other words, the UPR’s added value lies in
how far and high it can push the threshold of the SuRs for addressing
controversial human rights issues on the ground, even if that process is
slower than many would like.
Despite the aforementioned concern that the UPR process may
stagnate after the acceptance and implementation of “low-hanging fruit”
recommendations,162 (1) the impact on the ground from implementing “lowhanging fruit” recommendations is not to be underestimated (as it could
also pave the way for more actions to follow) and (2) the extra push
embodied by the Fight for Borderline Recommendations will ensure, at the
least, that through the power of peer pressure and the acculturation process,
the UPR mechanism challenges SuRs incrementally and constantly to
address sensitive human rights concerns. In other words, the Fight for
Borderline Recommendations will become even more critical for sustaining
the legitimacy and relevance of the UPR once a majority of “low-hanging
fruit” recommendations are implemented.
The UPR is positioned optimally to play this “extra push” role,
precisely because it is a political mechanism led by peers. As some scholars
articulate it, “[s]tates can dismiss experts and NGOs, but not other
states.”163 SuRs have various reasons to take recommendations given by
their peers seriously, such as their desires to avoid any confrontations,
maintain good relations, project positive images as human rights defenders,
attract technical and financial assistance, and secure and solidify their
positions in the international community. And, once accepted,
recommendations exert undeniable influence upon SuRs for the next four
and a half years. In fact, an empirical study found that “government
officials feel the need to show their domestic and international audiences,
as well as their colleague diplomats in the room, that they have already
acted upon many of the recommendations received in the previous
review.”164
The UPR’s unique strength in the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations is that, unlike other human rights instruments that are
more narrowly structured, with mandates centered around specific rights
and issues, the UPR by design encompasses a much wider range of human
rights concerns given that its scope of review is anchored by various
161
162
163
164
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instruments (notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). That
UPR Info has identified as many as 70 thematic issues covered by
recommendations165 speaks volumes for the UPR’s potential as a forum of
fighting for borderline recommendations, which clearly goes far beyond the
reach of other human rights mechanisms individually. Equally importantly,
unlike other human rights mechanisms, the UPR enjoys the truly universal
participation by all UN member states and thus enables all states to engage
in the Fight for Borderline Recommendations, albeit to varying degrees. In
short, no other mechanism is better positioned than the UPR to pursue the
Fight in equal, cooperative, and encompassing ways.
C. How to Engage in the Fight for Borderline Recommendations
An underlying premise for the Fight for Borderline Recommendations
is that it must be based upon SMART recommendations: that is, specific,
measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound.166 Thus, the Fight departs
significantly from “minimum action” and “continuing action”
recommendations and builds primarily upon “specific action”
recommendations (also “considering action” and “general action” ones to a
lesser extent).167 Another important premise is that recommending states are
sufficiently interested in contributing to the UPR’s primary objective of
“[t]he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground.”168 To
reiterate, the Fight does acknowledge the use of recommendations in a
more politically motivated manner: after all, the UPR is inevitably a
political mechanism led by states, and recommending states will continue
issuing purely diplomatic, non-confrontational, and toothless
recommendations. Moreover, states may issue recommendations that could
harm the UPR’s objectives, such as one from Bangladesh to Tonga to
“continue to criminalize consensual same sex.”169 While cognitive and
social pressures are expected to increasingly discourage such
recommendations over time through the acculturation process, the UPR’s
political nature will always embody both its strengths and weaknesses.
With these premises in mind, the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations essentially reframes the approach to recommendations
taken by recommending states and other relevant stakeholders.
165
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Specifically, it highlights three important points. First, it argues for shifting
away from predominantly binary, “all or nothing” approaches used in
developing recommendations to more composite approaches in which
recommending states and other relevant stakeholders view their end goals
in a step-by-step way, to alleviate a degree of commitment on behalf of
SuRs and improve the chance of acceptance. Take recommendations
concerning ratification of human rights treaties as an example, as these
account for the highest percentage of recommendations at around 20%.170
An encouraging sign is that a vast majority of these ratification-related
recommendations logically entail specific actions (roughly 65%) or ask
states to consider taking certain actions (16%).171 But it also means that
SuRs do not easily accept these recommendations; in fact, they note (reject)
about half of them.172 As will be evident in the case of Lao PDR, the
problem in this regard is that a majority of recommendations are
predominantly driven by end goals (as in “ratify . . . ”) without taking into
account either the level of interest of the SuR in particular treaties nor the
steps and processes said SuR must undertake before arriving at end goals.
A central task for recommending states and other relevant stakeholders is
then to address specific contexts and strive to develop borderline
recommendations that aim to attain end goals in the long run through
several preparatory steps.
Second, the Fight for Borderline Recommendations underscores the
importance of the addendum to UPR Working Group reports, which has
rarely, if ever, been discussed in the scholarly literature or practical
guidelines on the UPR. The addendum is a “hidden gem” of the UPR
process, as it provides a forum for the SuR to articulate their responses to
all recommendations given by their peers. Depending on how they are
worded, the responses to recommendations written by the SuR, even to
those recommendations they noted, and even if they do not articulate
reasons for noting, can illuminate the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations. The conduct of accepting and noting a wide range of
recommendations on various human rights concerns and issues in itself
paves the way for embarking on the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations, as it develops motivational patterns on behalf of the
SuR. In fact, the case study of Lao PDR in the next section shows that the
170
McMahon, Herding Cats, supra note 71, at 28. The UPR Info database also confirms this
statistic for the three review cycles (20%; 17,120 recommendations out of 86,762). UPR INFO,
Database, supra note 77.
171
The rest of the recommendations fall under the categories of general action (14%), continuing
action (5%), and minimal action (0%; only 47 out of 17,121 recommendations in total). UPR INFO,
Database, supra note 77.
172
Id.
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addendum could help to accurately assess the level of interest by the SuR in
and commitment to certain human rights concerns and develop appropriate
borderline recommendations to push the envelope, thereby effectively
demonstrating the UPR’s added value to the global human rights regime.
While this article primarily focuses on borderline recommendations
for which SuRs have indicated in the addendum some degree of interest in
accepting at a later point, the Fight for Borderline Recommendations can
certainly build upon other categories of recommendations such as “seedplanting” recommendations (i.e., softer recommendations potentially
paving the way for more meaningful recommendations to follow). If
accepted, seed-planting recommendations on human rights practices on the
ground could play an important role in inducing SuRs to commit to
recommendations concerning subsequent steps, thereby paving the way to
eventually implement end goals.173 Even if these “seed-planting”
recommendations are noted, they still serve as a useful indicator for
recommending states and other relevant stakeholders to gauge the level of
interest of the SuR at the time of the review session, allowing stakeholders
to adjust the wording and tone of such recommendations for the next
review session in a way that would be increasingly difficult for an SuR to
note.
Despite holding such potential, the addendum faces two major issues
to date. First, there is no systematic approach to completing it: some states
such as Switzerland174 and Bhutan175 have adopted a straightforward matrix
and articulated their reasons for noting each recommendation,176 whereas

173
Continuing with the example of recommendations on treaty ratification, consider “seedplanting” recommendations such as “conduct a gap analysis between the national legal framework and
the anticipated legal obligations under the treaty under consideration.” Such recommendations in
themselves may mean little in terms of the impact on human rights practices, but they could pave the
way for more meaningful recommendations to follow, such as “adopt action points derived from the
analysis,” which could effectively move SuRs steps closer towards the eventual ratification.
174
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Switzerland, Addendum,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/12/Add.1 (Feb. 23, 2018).
175
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bhutan, Addendum, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/42/8/Add.1 (Sept. 3, 2019).
176
Other countries such as Denmark and the United Kingdom have also articulated their reasons
for noting for each recommendation. See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Denmark, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/10/Add.1 (June 21, 2016); HRC, Rep. of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/25/Add.1 (Aug. 25, 2008). The United Kingdom
unfortunately stopped reporting on the reasons for noting recommendations in second and third cycles.
See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/9/Add.1 (Sept. 17, 2012); HRC, Rep.
of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/9/Add.1 (Sept. 7, 2017).
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others such as France177 and South Africa178 do not give any explanations
for noting recommendations. Without knowing the reasons for noting
certain recommendations, recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders are left with little choice other than to analyze acceptance and
rejection patterns, if any, based on responses by an SuR. From there,
recommending states develop types of borderline recommendations that
they believe an SuR would most likely accept, unless they can engage an
SuR in discussions during the implementation period to find out their
reasons for noting. Second, countries may have legitimate reasons for not
detailing their responses to received recommendations: as is the case for all
reports on which the review is based, the HRC has limited the addendum to
2,675 words,179 only five to eight pages in most cases. While recognizing
that one of the UPR’s principles is to “[n]ot be overly burdensome to the
concerned state or to the agenda of the Council,”180 the addendum is
currently a missed opportunity for the international community to better
understand the rationale of an SuR for noting recommendations. The third
key point for the Fight for Borderline Recommendations is that the volume
of recommendations given to a certain human rights issue matters to SuRs
in measuring how that issue is perceived by recommending states. While
the literature is rather thin in this area, one study found in the context of
women’s rights that “[n]umerous recommendations [regarding the same
human right] are likely more effective because they shine a spotlight on the
issue and force the government to confront it.”181 Given this context, the
article argues that both identical recommendations on the same issue, and
staggered recommendations that generate different levels of commitment,
would be useful for effectively pursuing the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations. In any case, regardless of whether an SuR ends up
accepting such recommendations, the number of recommendations signals
the level of concern over certain issues, which consequently exerts further
peer pressure on SuRs to address them.

177
HRC, Rep.of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: France, Addendum, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/38/4/Add.1 (May 10, 2018) [hereinafter France UPR].
178
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: South Africa, Addendum,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/16/Add.1 (Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter South Africa UPR].
179
HRC, annex, Follow-up to President’s Statement 8/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/PRST/9/2 (Sept. 24,
2008).
180
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 3(h).
181
Tufano, supra note 144, at 209.
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III. THE CASE OF LAO PDR
A. Lao PDR’s Engagement with UPR
To date, Lao PDR has undertaken three reviews in May 2010, January
2015, and January 2020.182 The number of recommendations for Lao PDR
has steadily increased, from 107 in the first cycle to 196 in the second and
226 in the third.183 Lao PDR’s overall acceptance rate in the three cycles
has been around 68% (80% in the first cycle, 60% in the second, and 71%
in the third).184 Detailed research on the implementation rate is beyond the
scope of this article and is difficult to ascertain primarily because none of
the reports by the government, United Nations, or civil society
organizations in the three cycles comprehensively discuss the
implementation status of all accepted recommendations. Giving a total of
208 recommendations to seventy countries over three cycles, Lao PDR’s
participation as a recommending state has been modest and largely focused
on Asian states.185
B. Identifying Borderline Recommendations
Recall that borderline recommendations are mainly divided into two
categories: (1) recommendations that SuRs have accepted but have yet to
implement and (2) recommendations that SuRs have noted but showed
interest in engaging with. One clear example of the first category of
borderline recommendations in Lao PDR is the ratification of the
International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (ICPPED). Throughout the three review cycles, Lao PDR
has consistently accepted recommendations so long as they are not raised in
connection with politically sensitive, alleged cases of enforced
disappearances186 (most notably the case of Sombath Somphone, a

182

See HRC, Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/LAIndex.aspx (last visited July 24, 2021).
183
Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶¶ 96-99; HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s Democratic Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/7, ¶ 121 (Mar.
23, 2015) [hereinafter Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR]; Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR, supra note 155, ¶ 115.
184
Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶¶ 96-99; Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160; Lao
PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 160; Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR add., supra note 155.
185
UPR INFO, Database, supra note 77. The most active recommending state is France at 2,384
recommendations given to all other UN member states. See id.
186
For instance, Lao PDR has accepted relevant recommendations such as “Ratify the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” but has noted
recommendations such as:
conclude the process of ratification of [the Convention] quickly, and investigate all cases of
enforced disappearance, including the case of Sombath Somphone, and of Laotians abroad, and
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prominent civil society leader who disappeared in December 2012 and has
not been seen since187). Interestingly, the Government of Lao PDR
explicitly expressed its interest in ratifying the ICPPED as part of its
voluntary commitment in the national report for the first review cycle, that
is, before the first review even took place.188 And yet the Government has
gradually toned down its commitment to ratifying the Convention ever
since. For instance, it only mentioned in the national report for the second
cycle that “the country has begun the preparation for its early
ratification,”189 while also reiterating under the “Commitments” section that
it “will consider to accede to human rights conventions, including the
ratification of the [ICPPED].”190 The third national report did not make any
specific reference to the ratification of the Convention, as it focused on
reporting the progress on implementing recommendations concerning the
case of Sombath Somphone.191
The case of Lao PDR also provides examples of the second category
of borderline recommendations: those recommendations that were noted
but with apparent interest by the SuR. Such examples include the
ratification of three international instruments, namely, the Rome Statute of

bring perpetrators to justice” and “in addition to considering the early ratification of [the
Convention], continue to make efforts to address the case of the missing human rights defender.
Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR, supra note 155, ¶ 115; see also Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR add., supra note 155, at 2-4
(showing Lao PDR’s responses).
187
The case of Sombath Somphone has been extensively covered by the media, NGOs,
governments, and regional and multilateral organizations. See e.g., SOMBATH SOMPHONE, https://www.
sombath.org/en/ (last visited July 25, 2021); Jonah Fisher, Fears Grow for Abducted Laos Campaigner
Sombath, BBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22338101; Press Release,
Kingsley Abbott, ICJ Senior Legal Adviser, Laos: Eight Years On, the Fate of Sombath Somphone
Remains Unresolved and Government Remains Unaccountable, (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.icj.org/
laos-eight-years-on-the-fate-of-sombath-somphone-remains-unresolved-and-government-remainsunaccountable; Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks: 100 Days Since the
Disappearance of Lao Civil Society Leader Sombath Somphone, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 24, 2013),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/03/206599.htm; Resolution on Laos: the Case of
Sombath Somphone, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2013)0058 (2013); A Year On, the Enforced
Disappearance of Sombath Somphone Continues with Impunity in Lao PDR, OHCHR (Dec. 16, 2013),
https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14103&LangID=E.
188
HRC, Nat’l Rep. Submitted in Accordance with ¶ 15(a) of the Annex to H.R.C. Res. 5/1: Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/8/LAO/1 (Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Lao PDR’s 1st Nat’l Rep.].
189
Lao PDR’s 2nd Nat’l Rep., supra note 159, ¶ 9.
190
Id. ¶ 75.
191
However, a Lao government representative mentioned at the Human Rights Committee meeting
that Lao PDR has not been able to ratify the Convention “in part because it [is] a complex instrument”
and also “until Lao officials had gained greater familiarity with it.” Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant (Continued):
Initial Reports of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.3504, (July 11,
2018).
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the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Convention on Landmines,
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), as well as the
establishment of a national human rights institution. How do we know that
Lao PDR has expressed interest in engaging with these recommendations
even though it has noted them? The answer lies in a hidden gem of the
UPR mechanism: the addendum to the UPR Working Group report.
Starting with the Rome Statute and the Ottawa Convention, Lao PDR
in the addendum to the UPR Working Group report for the first review
accepted relevant recommendations on both instruments “in part.”192 It
explained in the addendum that “the Lao PDR supports the principles
enshrined in the ICC Statute . . . [and] [t]he ratification of the Rome Statute
is accordingly in line with the Government’s policies” but that “[g]iven the
country’s present circumstances with particular reference to its capacities,
the Lao PDR is not in a position to ratify the Rome Statute.”193 The
addendum further states that Lao PDR will “continue its efforts in this
regard to educate and inform the relevant officials in the judiciary, the
military and the law enforcement agencies about the Rome Statute and its
principles.”194 Similarly, it mentions that “[r]atification of the Ottawa
Convention is . . . clearly in line with Lao Government’s policies” but that
“the Lao PDR is not yet ready to become a party to this treaty.”195
Nevertheless, it also notes that it “will continue to study it thoroughly to
prepare for its implementation once conditions are ripe for ratification.”196
In subsequent reviews, Lao PDR did not resort to the “partial acceptance”
response and noted all recommendations on ratification of the Rome

192
See Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160. In the first review cycle, SuRs frequently used
“partial acceptance” as part of their official responses to recommendations. But given the lack of clarity
in some SuRs’ responses, the HRC stipulated that for the second cycle and onwards, SuRs “should
clearly communicate to the Council . . . [their] positions on all received recommendations,” thereby
reemphasizing that SuRs have only two options: accepting or noting. H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 31,
¶ 16. However, some states, such as Bulgaria and Singapore, have continued the practice of accepting
some recommendations “in part.” See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Bulgaria, Addendum, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/13/Add.1. (Feb. 15, 2021); HRC, Rep. of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore, Addendum, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/32/17/Add.1, at 2-8 (June 13, 2016) [hereinafter Singapore’s 2nd UPR add.]. Egypt responded
to recommendations while creating six categories: “fully accepted recommendations; partially accepted
recommendations; implemented recommendations; unacceptable recommendations; inaccurate
recommendations; and two recommendations that were deemed to be hostile.” HRC, Rep. of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Egypt, Addendum, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/43/16/Add.1 (Mar. 5, 2020).
193
Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160, ¶ 2.
194
Id.
195
Id. ¶ 3.
196
Id.
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Statute. However, it reiterated in the addendum for the second review that
“the Lao PDR supports the principles enshrined in the ICC Statute . . .
[and] [t]he ratification of the Rome Statute is accordingly in line with the
Government’s policies.”197 As for the Ottawa Convention, no
recommending states have followed up on this particular recommendation,
despite Lao PDR’s “partial acceptance” in the first review.198
Unlike the Rome Statute and the Ottawa Convention, Lao PDR did
not accept recommendations on ratification of the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW in the first review.199 Yet it mentioned in the addendum for the
first review that it “recognizes the importance of gender equality . . . [and]
organized a workshop to discuss the content of the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW to gather comments and opinions from all stakeholders on the
Protocol” before reaching a conclusion that “Lao PDR needs more time to
study the Protocol, to raise awareness among officials, women’s
organisations and the public at larger [sic].”200 In the addendum for the
second review, Lao PDR repeated the message about needing more time to
study the Protocol.201 Importantly, when clarifying that it was not ready to
ratify optional protocols to other core human rights treaties such as the
ICCPR, ICESCR, and CAT, Lao PDR did not refer to any specific efforts
taken to study these protocols, thereby insinuating a different level of
interest between the Optional Protocol to CEDAW and these other optional
protocols.202 Unfortunately, no recommending states followed up on this
particular recommendation in the third review despite both the UN Country
Team in Lao PDR203 and the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women204 recommending ratification of the
Optional Protocol.
Throughout the three review sessions, Lao PDR has received and
noted recommendations on establishing a national human rights institution

197

Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 160, at 3.
For the recommendations, see Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR, supra note 183, ¶ 121; Lao PDR’s 3rd
UPR, supra note 155, ¶ 115. For Lao PDR’s “partial acceptance” of the recommendation on the Ottawa
Convention, see Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160. ¶ 3.
199
Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160, ¶ 20.
200
Id.
201
Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 160, at 2.
202
Id.
203
See UN Country Team, Annex 1 – UN Country Team Contribution to the 3rd UPR of the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, ¶ 14 (July 18, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/
UPRLAUNContributionsS35.aspx.
204
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the
Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reps. of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/LAO/CO/8-9 (Nov. 14, 2018).
198
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(NHRI) in accordance with the Paris Principles.205 In the first review, Lao
PDR noted only three recommendations immediately at the review session,
with two being recommendations on establishing a NHRI, which may
indicate the government’s strong, pre-determined position on this issue.206
In the addendum for the second review, Lao PDR reasoned that, led by the
National Steering Committee on Human Rights, “the Lao PDR has national
mechanisms that deal with human rights, almost similar to the Paris
principles-based NHRI.”207 And yet, it insinuated some degree of interest:
“Nevertheless, the Lao PDR will study experience [sic] of other countries
that have a successful NHRI and may consider NHRI in the future.”208 In
the addendum for the third review, Lao PDR took a more assertive position
on this matter: “[a]fter extensive consultations and studies, as well as
exchanging lessons learnt from other countries, the Lao PDR has come to
the conclusion that it will continue to maintain its existing domestic
mechanism, namely the National Committee on Human Rights (NCHR), as
the overarching human rights mechanism for the promotion and protection
of human rights at the national level.”209 However, albeit outside the UPR
mechanism, Lao PDR has shown its willingness to continue aligning the
functions of the National Committee more closely with the Paris Principles:
“[a]t present, the Lao Government is focusing on improving and
strengthening the existing national mechanisms on the promotion and
protection of human rights, such as . . . improving the roles and mandate of
the National Steering Committee on Human Rights”210 and “[s]teps were
being taken to review the mandate of the National Steering Committee on
Human Rights, taking into account the Paris principles and advice from the
international community.”211 As the scope of the UPR includes human
rights instruments that states are party to,212 these statements made in the
205

See sources cited supra notes 155, 159-160, & 183 for all the recommendations that Lao PDR
received and its responses. For details on the Paris Principles, see Paris Principles, GLOB. ALL. OF
NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS INST., https://ganhri.org/paris-principles/ (last visited July 25, 2021). See also
G.A. Res. 48/134, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Dec. 20,
1993); G.A. Res. 72/181, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Dec.
19, 2017); HRC Res. 39/17, National Human Rights Institutions (Sept. 28, 2018).
206
See Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶ 99.
207
Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 160, at 5.
208
Id.
209
Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR , supra note 155, at 2.
210
Human Rights Comm., List of Issues in Relation to the Initial Rep. of Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Addendum: Replies of Lao People’s Democratic Republic to the List of Issues, ¶ 7, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/LAO/Q/1/Add.1 (June 4, 2018).
211
Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40
of the Covenant (Continued): Initial Report of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Continued), ¶ 59,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.3505 (July 12, 2018).
212
See H.R.C Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
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context of the Human Rights Committee could play an important role in
recommending states’ efforts to induce Lao PDR to accept NHRI- or Paris
Principles-related recommendations.
A critical point about the second category of recommendations is that
as far as the addendum to UPR Working Group reports is concerned, an
SuR is only expected to give “[w]ritten views on conclusions and/or
recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the
SuR after the session of the Working Group.”213 Thus, Lao PDR was under
no obligation to indicate its interest in accepting these borderline
recommendations. In fact, other states such as France and South Africa did
not give any explanations for noting certain recommendations.214 That Lao
PDR nevertheless decided to do so speaks volumes about the prospect of
engaging it in the Fight for Borderline Recommendations.
Before concluding this subsection, this article emphasizes the
importance of acceptance and implementation of these borderline
recommendations. For instance, ratification of these three international
instruments (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ottawa
Convention on Landmines, and the CEDAW Optional Protocol) would
undoubtedly expand the scope of legal responsibilities on the part of the
Lao government as well as the scope of rights protected for people.
Ratification of the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance would redefine the criminal justice system of Lao
PDR, as it has yet to recognize enforced disappearance as a crime in its
national legal framework.215 Similarly, ratification of the Optional Protocol
to CEDAW would allow the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women to receive and consider communications
submitted by individuals or groups regarding alleged violations by the
state-party of any of the rights set forth in the Convention.216 For this
reason, the Fight for Borderline Recommendations is directly relevant to
the UPR’s primary objective of improving human rights situations on the
ground.217 The ratification of these treaties is not an end in itself: they must
be properly implemented to bring about their intended impact on the
ground. Thus, the Fight to challenge the thresholds of the SuRs carries on
until the UPR’s primary objective is fulfilled.

213

HRC, supra note 179, at 3.
See France UPR, supra note 177; South Africa UPR supra note 178.
215
See Human Rights Comm., supra note 191, ¶ 34 (to date, Lao PDR holds “no legal obligation to
ensure that enforced disappearance constituted an offence under its criminal law.”).
216
For more details on the Optional Protocol, see generally G.A. Res. 54/4 (Oct. 6, 1999).
217
H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 3, ¶ 4(a).
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C. How to Engage in Fight for Borderline Recommendations
Recall that in addition to the use of UPR Working Group reports’
addenda which articulate responses of an SuR to all received
recommendations, the overall strategy for the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations entails two more important components: (1) to shift
away from only offering traditional, binary recommendations directly
aimed at implementing end goals and instead focus more on composite
ones that view the goals in a more incremental way; and (2) to consider
increasing the volume of recommendations on a specific human rights
issue. Building on Lao PDR’s responses made in the addenda, this section
applies these two strategies to the aforementioned borderline
recommendations that Lao PDR has received.
1.

Category 1 of Borderline Recommendations: Accepted but Not
Implemented
An advantage of engaging in the Fight for the first category of
borderline recommendations is that SuRs have already accepted such
recommendations, thereby explicitly expressing their commitment to
following up on them. Regardless of the legal status of UPR
recommendations,218 once accepted, they (1) constitute the “civilizing force
of hypocrisy” which would induce SuRs to adhere to what they committed
to in the presence of the public;219 (2) increase the likelihood of conformity
given the importance of this inclusive and universal human rights
mechanism for SuRs, their exposure to the mechanism, and the size of peer
states equally (if not more) committed to accepting and implementing
recommendations;220 and (3) activate the power of peer pressure and
acculturation to empower recommending states, civil society, and other
relevant stakeholders to hold SuRs accountable for what they committed
to.221
There is no doubt that ratification of the ICPPED has become highly
political and sensitive for all stakeholders in Lao PDR since the case of
Sombath Somphone’s alleged enforced disappearance in 2012.222 Thus it is
possible that Lao PDR’s interest in implementing recommendations related
218
As UPR recommendations address concerns and issues in a wide range of fields, it is difficult to
define their legal status as a whole. As an indication, however, one scholar finds it “premature to think
of the UPR as a law-making process,” but also “not entirely adequate to think of recommendations as
simple declaratory statements with only political implications’’ given that some recommendations make
reference to existing legal obligations that SuRs have ratified. Cowell, supra note 143, at 182.
219
See Elster, supra note 127, at 111.
220
See supra Goodman & Jinks, note 21, at 642.
221
See Conte, supra note 22, at 197.
222
For details on the case, see supra note 187.
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to ICPPED has indeed waned, pushing these recommendations closer to the
second category of borderline recommendations had it not accepted them in
the first cycle. Regardless of the motive to delay the process, it remains true
that Lao PDR expressed its voluntary commitment to consider ratifying the
Convention in the national report before receiving any recommendations in
the first review,223 and has consistently accepted recommendations asking
for the ratification in a general term.224 To indicate the magnitude of this
acceptance, the Human Rights Committee has also urged Lao PDR to ratify
the Convention in its Concluding Observations, by referring to the fact that
“the state party accepted [to ratify it] in the context of the universal
periodic review of the HRC, in 2010 and 2015.”225
So how can recommending states and other relevant stakeholders
engage in the Fight so as to induce Lao PDR to eventually ratify the
Convention? It goes without saying that they should continue issuing
recommendations explicitly asking Lao PDR to ratify it in order to ensure
its continued commitment. In the meantime, should the status quo remain,
the Fight for Borderline Recommendations suggests that stakeholders
should consider developing more composite recommendations, so that they
can measure the progress Lao PDR makes towards the actual ratification
more closely and concretely. For instance, a recommendation to develop
and adopt a roadmap (or an action plan) to detail the timeline and action
points to concretize the path to ratification is much needed.
The rationale for developing this type of recommendation is that it
will reify the ratification process for all relevant stakeholders on a step-bystep basis and clarify what specific actions Lao PDR has to take at each
phase in order to move closer towards the ratification of the Convention.
Such recommendations could engage Lao PDR more effectively in more
concrete and constructive discussions, rather than simply insisting on
ratification. Of course, recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders can develop even more effective recommendations if they are
familiar with key bottlenecks delaying the ratification. For instance, if the
alignment of the national legal framework with the obligations under the
Convention is an obstacle to ratification (as hinted by the government),226
223

Lao PDR’s 1st Nat’l Rep., supra note 188, ¶ 78.
See supra notes 155, 159-160, 183 for all the recommendations that Lao PDR received and its
responses.
225
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Rep. of the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, ¶ 20(f), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LAO/CO/1 (July 23, 2018).
226
See Human Rights Comm., supra note 191, ¶ 34 (a Lao government representative stated at a
Human Rights Committee meeting in 2018 that “[t]he Government had not ratified the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in part because it was a
complex instrument. In some ways, it could be seen as two instruments in one, as it covered matters,
224
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stakeholders can recommend that Lao PDR conduct a gap analysis and
implement action points that derive from the analysis or develop new
legislation and/or amend existing ones to incorporate the obligations under
the Convention. As Lao PDR has already accepted recommendations on
ratification, it will not be able to justify noting these recommendations,
thereby allowing all relevant stakeholders to pressure Lao PDR more
effectively to take concrete actions at each stage and make steady progress
towards the eventual ratification.
Consideration for the volume of recommendations may not play as
significant of a role for the first category of borderline recommendations in
general and certainly in the case of Lao PDR, given that these
recommendations are already accepted. However, as in the case for the
second category, it is critical that the wording of composite
recommendations come in variations ranging from more “frameworkoriented” recommendations such as the action plan to recommendations
aimed more for specific steps so as to make the optimal progress towards
the eventual ratification.
2.

Category 2 of Borderline Recommendations: Noted but with
Interest
In general, the same principles apply also to the second category of
borderline recommendations. But the crucial difference between the first
and second categories is that the latter has yet to enjoy the full acceptance
of SuRs. Thus, the second category is more concerned with the question of
how to induce SuRs to support borderline recommendations themselves, so
as to engage SuRs in substantive discussions to address certain human
rights concerns.
Starting with ratification of the three international instruments (i.e.,
the Rome Statute, the Ottawa Convention, and the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW), Lao PDR has clearly expressed its agreement with principles
stipulated under these treaties.227 The primary issue for Lao PDR has been
that it needs more time to study its obligations under such treaties before
ratifying them.228 The issue with related recommendations is that they focus

such as communications and visits, often covered by separate instruments.”). The 2017 Law on Treaties
and International Agreement stipulates the rights and requirements of line ministries and agencies to
align the national legal framework with treaties both before and after ratifying them. See Law on
Treaties and International Agreement (2017) (Lao PDR) arts. 8, 23(7), 24(5), 25(6), 38(4), 41(5),
114(3), 115(6), & 116(2).
227
See generally supra pp. 35-38.
228
For instance, Lao PDR mentioned in the addendum for the first review cycle that “[r]atification
of the Ottawa Convention is . . . clearly in line with Lao Government’s policies” but that “the Lao PDR
is not yet ready to become a party to this treaty.” Lao PDR’s 1st UPR add., supra note 160, ¶ 2. It also
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exclusively on ratification itself, as all recommendations on ratification of
these three treaties given during the three reviews start with either
“ratify . . . ,” “accede to . . . ,” or “become a party to . . . .”229 Thus the Fight
for these borderline recommendations entails (1) shifting away from those
end goals-oriented recommendations to ones that recognize steps and
measures to be taken before ratification and (2) building on these
composite recommendations to engage Lao PDR in the acculturation
process so as to induce behavioral changes necessary for an eventual
commitment to ratification.
The underlying challenge with the second category of borderline
recommendations is for recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders to understand exactly how far they can push the envelope.
This is where the volume of recommendations plays a critical role in
gauging the level of Lao PDR’s commitment to addressing certain human
rights concerns. In this regard, recommending states should, in close
consultation and coordination with each other and other relevant
stakeholders, develop a range of recommendations that they believe that
Lao PDR would likely support. An example of the softest
recommendations would be those focusing on learning, such as selfresearch of specific treaties and study tours to other countries who have
recently ratified these treaties. Less soft recommendations may ask Lao
PDR to officially adopt and implement action points derived from these
learning activities. Perhaps ideal borderline recommendations would be to
develop and adopt a national action plan detailing the timeline and action
points towards the actual ratification. Given that Lao PDR has indicated a
certain degree of interest, it may much more likely accept
recommendations within this range than ones directly aimed at ratification.
Lao PDR has taken more concrete actions (e.g., extensive
consultations with relevant stakeholders and studies on other countries’
experiences)230 with regard to recommendations on the establishment of a
NHRI despite noting all such recommendations,231 which indicates its

stated that “Lao PDR needs more time to study the [Optional Protocol to CEDAW], to raise awareness
among officials, women’s organisations and the public at larger [sic].” Id. ¶ 20.
229
For recommendations on the Rome Statute, see Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶ 98.6;
Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR, supra note 183, ¶¶ 121.14, 121.29-121.35; Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR, supra note 155,
¶¶ 115.21-115.23. For the Ottawa Convention, see Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶ 98.10. For
the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, see Lao PDR’s 1st UPR, supra note 159, ¶ 98.5; Lao PDR’s 2nd
UPR, supra note 183, ¶¶ 121.10-121.11.
230
Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 160, at 5.
231
See supra notes 155, 159-160, 183 for all the recommendations that Lao PDR received and its
responses.
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interest in complying with the Paris Principles to a certain degree.232 Of
course, Lao PDR articulated that it “has come to the conclusion that it will
continue to maintain its existing domestic mechanism, namely the National
Committee on Human Rights (NCHR), as the overarching human rights
mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights at the national
level.”233 But that should not and does not stop recommending states and
other relevant stakeholders from engaging Lao PDR in a further Fight. Lao
PDR’s interest in aligning the National Committee on Human Rights234
with the Paris Principles to a degree would certainly form the basis for such
a Fight.235 For instance, recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders could consider developing recommendations to commit Lao
PDR to further structural reforms of the National Committee, such as
revising the composition and appointment mechanism to ensure pluralism
in the Committee’s membership, vesting adequate power to enable broad
mandates and functions, and providing adequate financial, institutional, and
human resources.236
The underlying rationale for suggesting these recommendations on the
NHRI reiterates the UPR’s political nature: after all, SuRs control their
own fate under this mechanism as they are the ones that will decide
whether to support or note recommendations. Recommending states and
other relevant stakeholders must work within such limitations while also
striving to induce behavioral changes in that process. Ideally, Lao PDR
would eventually accept NHRI-related recommendations and establish a
national human rights institution, but it may not do so based solely on
binary and “all or nothing” recommendations. Rather, the proposed
recommendations aimed at aligning the National Committee on Human
Rights in accordance with the Paris Principles represent long-term efforts
to bring Lao PDR closer to international standards, and could embody the
acculturation process of gradually acclimatizing Lao PDR to the idea of
establishing a NHRI fully in line with the Paris Principles. Constant
232
For details on the Paris Principles, see Paris Principles, GLOB. ALL. OF NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
INST., supra note 205.
233
Lao PDR’s 3rd UPR add., supra note 155, at 2.
234
The National Committee on Human Rights is a purely governmental body “chaired by the
minister to the Prime Minister’s Office and composed of representatives from the government, National
Assembly, the judiciary, and [Lao People’s Revolutionary Party]-affiliated organizations” and
supported by “[t]he Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs act[ing]
as the secretariat.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. & LAB., 2020 COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE: LAOS 16 (Mar. 30, 2021).
235
Human Rights Comm., supra note 211, ¶ 59.
236
In addition to the Paris Principles, GLOB. ALL. OF NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note
205, see General Observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation, GLOB. ALL. OF NAT’L HUMAN
RIGHTS INST. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://ganhri.org/accreditation/general-observations/.
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pressure to raise the threshold for SuRs addressing sensitive human rights
concerns, however slight of a change that may be, embodies the Fight for
Borderline Recommendations.
Beyond these two categories of borderline recommendations, other
types of recommendations, such as seed-planting recommendations, could
also pave the way for embarking on the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations. For instance, a recommendation given by Japan (and
accepted by Lao PDR), to “take additional measures for the protection of
women and children,”237 is in itself too broad to entail any specific action.
But Japan and other relevant stakeholders could use this recommendation
as an umbrella framework to suggest concrete additional measures to be
taken either during the implementation period or in the next review,
thereby turning a seemingly empty recommendation into something more
meaningful and substantive for further protection of women and children.
And this seed-planting recommendation may pave the way for inducing
Lao PDR to eventually accept recommendations such as the ratification of
optional protocols to CEDAW and CRC allowing individual complaints
procedures.238 In this regard, it is critical that recommending states, SuRs,
and other relevant stakeholders alike commit themselves to a long-term
undertaking by concretizing these soft, seed-planting recommendations
with more specific actions, which may leverage an SuR into continuing to
accept and implement step-by-step recommendations.
D. Potential of Fight for Borderline Recommendations
To examine the potential of the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations, the author of this article conducted an interview with a
high-ranking Lao government official239 who is very familiar with the UPR
process. This official responded to interview questions within their
personal capacity and the opinions and thoughts that this official expressed
during the interview do not represent those of the Lao government.
237
Compare Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR, supra note 183, ¶ 121.45; with Lao PDR’s 2nd UPR add., supra
note 160, at 4.
238
Lao PDR is not a party to any optional protocols allowing for such procedures under core
human rights treaties. See the UN Treaty Body Database: Reporting status for Lao PDR,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=LAO&Lang
=EN (last visited July 27, 2021). Through optional protocols, some core human rights treaties such as
ICCPR, CEDAW, and CRC establish communications procedures in which individuals and groups of
people are allowed to submit their complaints to relevant treaty committees about violations of their
rights stipulated in these treaties. For more details on individual complaints procedures, see Human
Rights Bodies - Complaints Procedures, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/tbpetitions/pages/
hrtbpetitions.aspx (last visited January 7, 2022).
239
Online Interview via video-conference with Anonymous High-Ranking Lao Official (Aug. 13,
2021). This official agreed to speak on condition of anonymity.
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The official mentioned that the UPR’s unique value lies in the
universality of states and rights covered in the UPR mechanism.240 In this
regard, the official believes that the inclusion of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was indeed critical to ensure that the scope of the review
extends beyond the treaties to which an SuR is party. In terms of the high
level of commitment to the UPR process in general and also the high rate
of recommendations acceptance, the Official repeatedly stressed the
importance of “obligations to take part” by the SuRs as well as their desire
to remain part of the “club,”241 which certainly appears to reinforce the
relevance of peer pressure and a sense of belonging for an SuR.
Furthermore, the official views the actual review session as an ideal
opportunity for SuRs to showcase progress in improving human rights
situations and to demonstrate at the international level that SuRs care about
addressing human rights issues in their countries, often by accepting many
recommendations. In response to the statistic that about half of accepted
recommendations have been either partially or fully implemented,242 the
official found it rather encouraging as some recommendations are indeed
challenging and time-consuming to implement within the four and a half
years. The gap between the acceptance and implementation rates perhaps
reifies a dilemma between the willingness of an SuR to accept these
recommendations and the reality that they face in implementing them
within what the official called “such a short time.”243 The official also
pointed out the methodological and analytical challenge to measuring the
implementation status of accepted recommendations, especially when the
recommendations are worded in general terms.
In terms of the Fight for Borderline Recommendations, the official
agrees that the volume of recommendations on the same issue plays a role
in adding more pressures on SuRs. Especially when the recommendations
are related to sensitive human rights issues, the official noted that
governments normally pay attention to the number of recommending states
raising such issues: for instance, in the Lao context, the government looked
into such information for recommendations on the establishment of a
NHRI.244 But the official did emphasize that the volume of
recommendations is not “the decisive factor” dictating the government’s
decision to either support or note recommendations. Rather, the more
important factor is the nature of recommendations (i.e., whether they are in
240
241
242
243
244

Id.
Id.
UPR INFO, BEYOND PROMISES, supra note 13, at 14.
Online Interview, supra note 239.
Id.
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line with national policies, based on realistic and reliable sources, specific
and time-bound, and sensitive or not). This opinion appears to confirm to a
degree (1) that SuRs do not face much difficulty in accepting “easy”
recommendations and (2) that the UPR mechanism might confront the
issue of stagnation once SuRs implement those “low-hanging fruit”
recommendations.245 The official was ambivalent towards the word limit
imposed on the addendum to UPR Working Group reports. On one hand, if
allowed for more space, the official believes that the Lao government
would attempt to include as much information as possible. On the other
hand, the word limit helps the government stay concise in its responses to
all received recommendations. In any case, the official emphasized the
importance of articulating the reasons for noting certain recommendations
as it would convey an important message to the HRC and the international
community as a whole, states that gave those recommendations, and all
relevant stakeholders within the SuRs.246
As for the “borderline recommendations” themselves, the official
clearly stated that “direct recommendations will not be comfortable [for
SuRs] and will have less chance for acceptance.”247 The official agreed that
“composite recommendations are very important to show that the
recommending states understand the reality in the SuR and the difficulty it
faces, and also not to put too much pressure on the SuR at the initial
stage.”248 The official opined that the Lao government might have accepted
“softer” step-by-step recommendations that would have laid the
groundwork for the eventual ratification of treaties such as the Rome
Statute and the Ottawa Convention. The official also suspects that the Lao
government might have accepted recommendations on the establishment of
a NHRI if they were more geared towards the improvement of the capacity
and mandate of the National Committee on Human Rights to bring it closer
to the Paris Principles. In this regard, the official emphasized that
recommending states should “not give recommendations just for the sake
of giving recommendations but look at the reality in the SuR.”249
Interestingly, the official did not find that the question of which state gives
a recommendation plays any important role, at least in the Lao context
where the government focuses more on the nature of recommendations.
The official instead found that the wording of recommendations is more
important in deciding whether to support or note; in fact, the official
245
246
247
248
249
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recalled that the Lao government decided to note a certain recommendation
over one word without which it was willing to accept.250
Admittedly, it is premature to reach any conclusion on the prospect for
the Fight for Borderline Recommendations in Lao PDR without conducting
further empirical research. But these interview findings indicate that even if
grappling with sensitive human rights issues, the Fight could serve as a
catalyst to push for improving human rights practices, albeit in a more
incremental manner. At the least, the findings underscore the importance of
developing recommendations that take into account the reality in the SuR
and its capacity, rather than insisting on end goal-oriented
recommendations.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE FIGHT FOR BORDERLINE RECOMMENDATIONS
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The Fight for Borderline Recommendations is not unique to the Lao
context and is indeed applicable elsewhere. But before delving into other
countries’ examples, it is worth emphasizing that the analysis conducted in
this section is descriptive in nature and does not take into account actual
local contexts nor human rights practices on the ground. Accordingly, the
primary purpose of this section is to show that the prospect for the Fight for
Borderline Recommendations is ubiquitous on paper. Considering the
straightforward nature of recommendations related to treaty ratification,
this section focuses on recommendations concerning treaty ratification. But
it certainly does not mean that the Fight for Borderline Recommendations
would be limited to such concerns. It only reinforces the importance of
familiarity with local contexts in properly understanding responses by SuRs
and identifying or developing borderline and “seed-planting”
recommendations.
Within Asia, Bhutan accepted a recommendation in its third review to
work towards ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities251 while noting all other thirty-three recommendations
concerning ratification of other human rights treaties, including ICCPR and
ICESCR.252 Bhutan explained in the addendum that it is “constrained by the
lack of adequate financial resources and technical capacity to meet various

250
Id. Unfortunately, the official couldn’t recall during our interview what this exact
recommendation was.
251
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bhutan, ¶ 157.1, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/42/8, (May 10, 2019).
252
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bhutan, Addendum, supra
note 175, at 2.
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obligations of the treaties/conventions”253 and thus that “the level of
national preparedness to assume new international obligations”254 dictates
its decision and also timing to ratify human rights treaties. Meanwhile,
Bhutan emphasized that “[t]he Royal Government is committed to
gradually accede to the remaining human rights instruments depending on
resource availability and capacity building.”255 Given this strong
commitment to engage with the remaining human rights treaties, the Fight
for Borderline Recommendations on this particular issue of treaty
ratification is more about how far recommending states can push the
envelope to begin the ratification process with other human rights treaties.
Without taking into account the local contexts in Bhutan, the article finds
that ratification of ICCPR and ICESCR would be most critical given their
almost universal ratification status and importance in covering most
fundamental rights.256 Nevertheless, the main problem with these thirtythree noted recommendations is that almost all of them start with either
“ratify” or “consider ratifying/acceding.”257 Considering that Bhutan also
noted the remaining, less direct recommendations related to treaty
ratification that began with verbs such as “intensify the process of
ratification” and “take steps towards ratifying,”258 the window of
opportunity for intervention by recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders may be admittedly narrow. Nonetheless, they can shift away
from these end goal-oriented recommendations, consider softer
recommendations as borderline and seed-planting ones, and encourage
Bhutan to conduct a range of preliminary projects (especially learningoriented ones) to better prepare for the eventual ratification. As Bhutan
clearly indicated the need for further support by the international
community at its review session,259 provision of financial and technical

253

Id.
Id.
255
Id.
256
Only 18 and 22 states have yet to take any action on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively.
For more details, see Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR, https://indicators.
ohchr.org/ (last visited July 27, 2021).
257
See HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bhutan, supra note
251, ¶ 158. Only five recommendations use verbs such as “intensify,” “take steps towards,” “encourage
accession to,” “take the necessary steps,” see id.
258
Compare id. with HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bhutan,
Addendum, supra note 175, at 2.
259
See HRC, supra note 251, ¶ 23 (emphasizing in its presentation that “[a] scarcity of resources,
and a lack of institutions or weak institutions, limited the capacity of Bhutan to meet its national and
international obligations, despite remaining committed to do so. Therefore, the Government was
seeking the support and understanding of the international community.”).
254
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support attached to these soft recommendations may increase the chance to
commit Bhutan to such undertakings and beyond.
Similarly, Malaysia was not ready to commit to end goal-oriented
recommendations to ratify the remaining core human rights treaties at the
time of its third review session.260 But it clearly stated in the addendum that
“[t]he Government of Malaysia commits itself to ratifying all remaining
core international human rights instruments as stated by the Prime Minister
at the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly.”261 The main
problem for Malaysia in terms of treaty ratification is that:
there is a need to achieve precise and full understanding of the relevant rights
and obligations as well as to consider the possibility of reconciling any of the
standards established by the said instruments with those embodied in longstanding domestic laws, traditions and circumstances as well as philosophy, as
reflected in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.262

But unlike Bhutan, Malaysia did accept softer seed-planting
recommendations, such as “[c]ontinue efforts to accede to international
treaties related to civil, political and cultural rights” and “[a]ccelerate the
process of ratification of the key international human rights instruments,”263
thereby leaving much wider space to engage in the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations during the implementation period and at the next review
session. Recommending states and other relevant stakeholders could give
more specific recommendations, such as (1) developing and adopting a
national action plan detailing the timeframe and action points towards the
actual ratification of specific or all remaining treaties and/or (2) conducting
gap analyses for the remaining core human rights treaties and ideally
adopting all action points deriving from the analyses.
Singapore is in a similar situation: in the second review, it noted all
recommendations directly asking to ratify specific human rights treaties
except for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).264 Yet it also stated in the addendum that
260
Compare HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia, ¶ 151,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/11 (Nov. 13, 2018) with HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review: Malaysia, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/11/Add.1, at 2-3 (Feb. 18, 2019)
[hereinafter Malaysia’s 3rd UPR add.].
261
Malaysia’s 3rd UPR add., supra note 260, ¶ 9.
262
Id. ¶ 19.
263
For the recommendations, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Malaysia, supra note 260, ¶ 151; for Malaysia’s responses, see Malaysia’s 3rd UPR add.,
supra note 260, ¶ 7.
264
For the recommendations, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Singapore, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/17 (Jan. 29, 2016); for Singapore’s responses, see
Singapore’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 192, ¶¶ 6, 51.
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“Singapore takes our treaty obligations seriously and engages actively with
the relevant treaty bodies.”265 The main bottleneck for Singapore in
accepting these recommendations is that it depends on the reviews
conducted by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights to
determine Singapore’s ability to ratify additional treaties.266 The logic
follows that “[s]ince we cannot prejudge the outcome of the review
process, we are unable to commit ourselves to ratifying any of these
specific treaties at this time, apart from [ICERD and an optional protocol to
CRC].”267 In the meantime, Singapore also accepted softer seed-planting
recommendations such as “[c]onsider the ratification of the international
human rights instruments, to which it is not yet a party” and “[c]ontinue its
accession to the core international human rights instruments.”268 It is
unfortunate that almost all recommending states continued with end goaloriented recommendations in Singapore’s third review conducted in May
2021, using such verbs as “ratify” and “consider ratifying.”269
Unsurprisingly, Singapore accepted recommendations that started with
“consider ratifying” and noted ones that asked for the actual ratification,
just as it did in the second review.270 Given (1) that the ratification process
largely depends upon the reviews by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on
Human Rights271 and (2) that Singapore only mentioned in its national
report for the third review that it “periodically review[s] whether to sign on
to additional human rights treaties, and [is] presently party to four of the
core human rights treaties,”272 these end-goal-oriented recommendations
may represent a missed opportunity to engage Singapore in the Fight for
Borderline
Recommendations
by
introducing
more
phased
recommendations.
The Fight for Borderline Recommendations appears equally
applicable beyond Asia in the area of treaty ratification. Papua New
Guinea, for instance, noted recommendations on ratification of various

265

Singapore’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 192, ¶ 5.
Id.
267
Id.
268
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore, supra note
264, ¶ 166.
269
See HRC, Draft Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/38/L13 (May 14, 2021).
270
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore, Addendum, ¶¶
55-56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/48/16/Add.1 (Sept. 10, 2021).
271
Singapore’s 2nd UPR add., supra note 192, ¶ 5.
272
HRC, Nat’l Rep. Submitted in Accordance with ¶ 5 of the Annex to H.R.C. Res. 16/21:
Singapore, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/38/SGP/1 (Feb. 11, 2021).
266
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optional protocols,273 yet mentioned in their addendum that “PNG will
ratify all core human rights treaties; however it will be pursued on the basis
of priorities, taking into account capacity and resource constraints in
fulfilling obligations stipulated therein.”274 Australia noted all
recommendations on ratification of the ICPPED275 but mentioned in the
addendum that “Australia will further consider the ratification of the
ICPPED.”276 Canada also noted the recommendation on ratification of the
ICPPED277 but explained in the addendum that “[federal, provincial, and
territorial] governments are in the process of analysing the Convention on
Enforced Disappearance and potential domestic considerations.”278 Sudan
noted many recommendations on treaty ratification in general, but stated in
the addendum that “[r]atifying many of the international human rights
treaties is under consideration,” specifically CEDAW.279 Tajikistan noted
the recommendation to ratify the Optional Protocol to ICESCR280 but
explained in the addendum that “Tajikistan does not accept this
recommendation . . . [as] [t]his issue requires further consideration, [but] a
working group has been established to this end.”281 With regard to the noted
recommendation to ratify the ICPPED and CRPD,282 Tajikistan stated that
“[a]t present, Tajikistan considers it feasible to accede to CRPD and
welcomes the technical support offered in fulfilling this recommendation.
[But] Tajikistan is not ready at this stage to accede to . . . ICPPED.”283
Trinidad and Tobago noted recommendations to ratify the CAT and its
Optional Protocol, mentioning (1) that “[b]ecoming a party to these
international legal instruments will require significant domestic legislative
273
For the recommendations, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Papua New Guinea, ¶ 104.1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/10 (July 13, 2016).
274
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Papua New Guinea,
Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/10/Add.1, at 5 n. 1 (Sept. 22, 2016).
275
For the recommendations, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Australia, ¶ 146, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/8 (Mar. 24, 2021).
276
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Australia, Addendum, ¶ 5,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/47/8/Add.1 (June 2, 2021).
277
For the recommendation, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Canada, ¶ 142.7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/11 (May 15, 2018).
278
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Canada, Addendum, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/11/Add.1 (Sept. 18, 2018).
279
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Sudan, Addendum, ¶
140.3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/8/Add.1 (Sept. 9, 2016).
280
For the recommendations, see HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Tajikistan, ¶ 118.6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/11 (May 11, 2016) [hereinafter Tajikistan UPR].
281
HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Tajikistan, Addendum, ¶
118.6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/11/Add.1 (Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Tajikistan UPR add.].
282
See Tajikistan UPR, supra note 280, ¶ 118.7.
283
See Tajikistan UPR add., supra note 281, ¶ 118.7.
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changes in Trinidad and Tobago because some of its provisions conflict
materially with existing legislation”284 and thus (2) that “[a] decision to
become a party to these instruments would . . . require national dialogue,
public consultation and consensus as a precursor in order to permit the
adoption of the policy contained in this instrument.”285
In summary, the Fight for Borderline Recommendations is clearly
applicable and ubiquitous on paper. Obviously, local contexts must be
taken into account to better understand and uncover true meanings of these
responses by SuRs. Regardless, it is worth emphasizing that the current
regulations of the UPR do not require SuRs to articulate their reasons for
noting recommendations; the only requirement is the SuR “clearly
communicate to the Council, in a written format preferably prior to the
Council plenary, its positions on all received recommendations.”286 In other
words, SuRs are only required to specify whether to accept or note
recommendations and are under no obligation to either articulate such
reasons nor indicate a certain level of interest in working with the
recommendations that they note. Thus, that SuRs mentioned in this section
voluntarily expressed interest in considering the ratification of human
rights treaties speaks volumes for the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations. Even if diplomatic courtesy were in play in this regard,
the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”287 and the power of peer pressure and the
acculturation process are not to be underestimated.
A main problem that has emerged from the experiences of Lao PDR
and other states in the UPR process is that most recommending states have
insisted on binary recommendations directly aimed at attaining end goals
rather than considering more composite recommendations that consciously
take into account various steps necessary before arriving at end goals. This
section focused on ratification-related recommendations and argued for the
need to shift away from the predominant focus on ratification itself and
develop more “step-by-step” and/or “seed-planting” recommendations so
as to gain momentum and effectively leverage SuRs into constructive
discussions towards the eventual ratification. Peer pressure and the
acculturation process inherently embedded into the UPR mechanism serve
important functions in this regard. While the acceptance of
recommendations is not an end in itself, it nonetheless embodies the
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“civilizing force of hypocrisy” inducing SuRs not to deviate significantly
from what they publicly committed.
V. THE WAY FORWARD FOR UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW
Despite the clear potential of the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations, the current modalities, practices, and regulations do not
provide an enabling environment for the Fight to thrive and fulfill the
UPR’s added value to the global human rights regime. Creating such an
environment will take concerted efforts by all relevant stakeholders
involved in the UPR process. Thus, the article concludes by suggesting the
way forward for the Universal Periodic Review in pursuing the Fight for
Borderline Recommendations.
First, SuRs must articulate the reasons for noting recommendations. If
they are interested in some of the noted recommendations but feel that they
are not ready to accept them regardless of the rationale, SuRs should be
encouraged to indicate so and explain the reasons in the addendum. It is
essential that states continue the practice of explaining the reasons.288 If
they hold renewed positions on such recommendations during the
implementation period, they can mention that in mid-term progress reports
and national reports for the next review. They should rely on such a
reporting mechanism to also explain why they have yet to fully implement
accepted recommendations, so that recommending states and other relevant
stakeholders can properly follow up on these accepted recommendations.
As the UPR is essentially a human rights monitoring mechanism primarily
based upon reporting, it is critical that SuRs supply all relevant information
to maximize the effectiveness of the UPR mechanism and also enable the
Fight for Borderline Recommendations.
Second, recommending states must reconceptualize the UPR as a
forum for the Fight for Borderline Recommendations and imagine what
types of recommendations they would accept as SuRs. In other words,
setting aside the use of recommendations to accomplish purposes other
than the improvement of human rights situations on the ground, states need
to shift away from insisting on end-goal oriented recommendations (which
SuRs have consistently noted) and adopt more step-by-step approaches.
After all, the UPR’s implementation period is only four and a half years.
Thus, recommending states must bear in mind the importance of
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developing SMART recommendations289 that speak directly to where SuRs
stand with particular human rights concerns. In this regard, friendly states
should bear in mind that they may exert significant influence on SuRs, as
an empirical study found that SuRs are more likely to accept
recommendations from their allies.290 The volume of recommendations
given to SuRs also plays an important role in signaling the magnitude of
certain human rights issues. In this regard, it is critical that recommending
states communicate and coordinate with each other and other relevant
stakeholders. Perhaps the most efficient way is for embassies, UN agencies,
and civil society organizations based in the SuRs to discuss their strategies
for the Fight for Borderline Recommendations, which could be either
reported back to their headquarters or incorporated into their reports for the
UPR process. Equally importantly, these stakeholders must follow up on
their own recommendations so as to ensure either implementation, if such
recommendations are accepted, or readjustment, if they are noted. In the
case of Lao PDR, it is unfortunate that recommending states did not raise
recommendations on the Ottawa Convention in the second review and
onwards nor on the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in the third review.
Third, civil society organizations also play an important role in the
UPR process even though they do not officially take part in the review
itself.291 These organizations must also reframe the UPR as a forum for
borderline recommendations and lobby recommending states to develop the
kind of recommendations that SuRs would not be able to note easily.
Another important way to contribute to the UPR process is to give as much
relevant information and input as possible into their stakeholder reports so
as to properly measure the accuracy of national reports and the impact of
accepted recommendations. In this regard, national human rights
institutions also play a critical role as in the aforementioned example of
Australia.292 Without CSOs, NHRIs, and UN agencies based in SuRs
comprehensively covering the implementation status for each accepted
recommendation, recommending states will not be able to develop effective
follow-up recommendations for the next cycle.
289
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Fourth, various UN entities are also responsible for contributing to the
creation of an enabling environment for the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations. First, with the underlying premise in mind that the UPR
is designed to “[n]ot be overly burdensome to the concerned state or to the
agenda of the Council,”293 the HRC should revisit the word limit
requirement for the addendum. The existing limitations discourage willing
states to articulate the reasons for noting recommendations in the
addendum.294 Furthermore, given that the number of recommendations has
steadily increased over the three review cycles,295 the strict word limit has
the effect of decreasing the number of words allowed to explain SuRs’
position on each recommendation. The Council should also revisit its
emphasis on focusing on accepted recommendations for second review
sessions and onwards.296 Albeit a logical measure, this emphasis could
unnecessarily divert attention from noted recommendations, especially
those to which SuRs have demonstrated some interest via the addendum. In
the Lao context, that recommending states did not raise recommendations
on the Ottawa Convention in the second and third reviews,297 nor on the
Optional Protocol to CEDAW in the third review,298 despite Lao PDR’s
interest in these instruments299 potentially exemplifying an unnecessary
diversion of attention from noted recommendations. Second, the troika and
the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights should be cautious
with the way they cluster recommendations. Clustering could certainly
affect the chance of an SuR accepting these recommendations. Third, of all
UN entities, the UN Country Team300 has easy access to the most relevant
and hands-on information reflecting the local reality and works closely
with SuRs, foreign embassies, and NGOs on the ground. Thus, no other
entity is in a better position than the UN Country Teams based in SuRs to
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submit a report covering the implementation status of all recommendations
given. Together with other stakeholders based in the SuRs, the UN Country
Teams also play a critical role in ensuring that accepted recommendations
are implemented in due time.
Last but not least, the article calls for more scholarly attention paid to
the Universal Periodic Review in general (especially in the U.S. legal
scholarship) and its recommendations in particular. Observing the first
fifteen years of its establishment alone, it is clear that UPR carries
significance for the international community as a whole. In this regard, it is
encouraging that studies on the UPR have been rapidly growing.301 While
certainly acknowledging the challenges to measure the impact of the UPR
on the improvements of human rights practices on the ground, the article
nonetheless argues that scholarly work should not shy away from
examining the UPR’s added value in this regard. As for the literature
specifically on UPR recommendations, it has shed light on various statistics
concerning recommendations, the scope and legal status of
recommendations, the wording and quality of recommendations, and the
issues of recommendations.302 This article builds upon this increasingly rich
scholarship, yet problematizes that little (if any) literature has grappled
with the question of how willing SuRs are to address certain human rights
issues (i.e., where the “border” lies in between accepting and noting
recommendations), which embodies the UPR’s added value. Focusing on
borderline recommendations is a key in maximizing the UPR’s potential as
a human rights mechanism, and such an approach is capable of producing
behavioral changes on the ground.
CONCLUSION
The UPR mechanism undoubtedly carries symbolic value as “the first
international human rights mechanism to achieve 100% voluntary
participation, addressing all 193 countries in the UN.”303 In this sense,
departing from the highly politicized Commission on Human Rights was in
itself an important value added to the global human rights machinery.
However, by focusing on recommendations, the article demonstrated one
way of addressing the fundamental yet hardly explored question of what
the UPR’s added value is in terms of its direct contribution to improving
human rights situations on the ground: with methodological and analytical
challenges of measuring the UPR’s impact on the ground in mind, the
UPR’s unique value lies not in boasting the high acceptance rate and the
301
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303
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relatively high implementation rate, but rather in providing a forum to
commit SuRs to accepting and implementing borderline recommendations
that they may not have otherwise undertaken. In other words, the UPR’s
success ultimately depends on whether and to what extent peer pressure by
recommending states and other stakeholders and the acculturation process
could lead to new or renewed commitments expressed by an SuR to
addressing sensitive human rights concerns, often in a gradual fashion. In
this regard, the Fight for Borderline Recommendations is indeed applicable
and ubiquitous in many country contexts, at least in theory. With the
theoretical framework laid out, whether or not the Fight for Borderline
Recommendations thrives in the UPR mechanism is substantially in the
hands of all relevant stakeholders involved in the review process.
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